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ABSTRACT 
This thesis consists of three essays on the impact of banking 
development and concentration on the real economy. By looking at 
three specific mechanisms, this work supports the hypothesis that 
access to finance may be a barrier to entry and exit of firms. 
Furthermore, it provides empirical evidence of non-linearity in the 
relationship between banking market structure and the real economy. 
The three essays adopt the Rajan-Zingales (1998) methodology, which 
is especially useful for establishing a causal relationship between 
finance and real sector performance as well as for overcoming potential 
endogeneity problems. 
The first essay investigates the relationship between bank concentration 
and the real economy by analyzing the number and average size of 
firms in manufacturing industries in two samples of countries with 
differing levels of economic development. The main finding is that in 
developed countries a higher bank concentration is associated with a 
lower number of firms, of bigger size, while in developing countries 
this relationship does not seem significant. 
The second essay analyzes the effect of bank concentration on firm 
demography, conditional on the depth of credit markets. The empirical 
evidence on a sample of EU countries shows negative effects of bank 
concentration on firm demography when domestic the size of banking 
market is sufficiently large. This suggests that bank concentration in 
itself is not a barrier to entry and exit of firms. 
The third essay extends a recent cross-country study by Coricelli and 
Roland (2008) on the asymmetric effects of banking development on 
real economy performance, distinguishing periods of economic 
expansion from declines. Using data for Italy, this essay examines the 
issue at regional level and shows that more developed local credit 
markets are associated with lower declines in firm net entry rates. 
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ESSAY I 
BANK CONCENTRATION AND STRUCTURE OF 
MANUFACTURING SECTORS: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HIGH 
AND LOW INCOME COUNTRIES 
 
 
I.1 INTRODUCTION 
The effect of financial systems on the real economy has been analyzed 
since Schumpeter (1912). In the 1960s, interest on the subject was 
renewed by Goldsmith’s (1969) who found a positive correlation 
between the level of financial development and level of economic 
activity. However, only since the early 1990s a large number of 
empirical studies has found a strong casual relationship (taking 
advantage of the availability of better quality and larger cross-country 
datasets, and of advances in econometric techniques) between 
developed and more efficient financial markets and economic growth. 
Based on these findings, a growing body of research has focused on the 
mechanisms through which finance affects the real economy, to isolate 
characteristics of financial systems that influences real sector 
performance and, eventually, future economic growth. 1 
A large number of scholars have analyzed the impact of bank 
concentration on the real economy, both from a theoretical and 
empirical point of view. As summarized by Bonaccorsi di Patti and 
Dell’Ariccia (2004), theories based on the structure-conduct-
performance paradigm would suggest that any situation that does not 
                                                          
1 We refer to this literature as finance and growth literature. To sum, there is 
substantial agreement on the positive and causal effect of financial system 
development on real economy performance. See, among others, King and 
Levine (1993a, 1993b), Levine and Zervos (1998), La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), 
Rajan and Zingales (1998), Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), Levine et 
al. (2000), and Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000). See Levine (2005), Eschenbach 
(2004), Papaioannou (2007) for extensive reviews of the literature, focusing on 
different estimation approaches and levels of aggregation of data. 
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correspond to perfect competition is inefficient and, therefore, would 
have a negative impact on real sectors performance by limiting firms’ 
access to finance. On the other hand, banks act as information 
producers and thus, under certain circumstances, they may facilitate 
access to finance through the smoothing of the asymmetric information 
problems that characterize the lending relationship, in particular with 
more opaque firms. 
The value of a lending relationship depends on the borrowing firm’s 
future performance, which depends on the number of competitors. It is 
likely that incumbents and new firms compete for funding. Therefore, 
banks may influence the market structure of non-financial sectors by 
choosing to lend to incumbents instead of to new entrants, or the other 
way round.    
In the light of the above countervailing theoretical hypotheses, on one 
hand, it can be predicted that in a concentrated banking market, banks 
have lower incentive to finance new entrants and prefer to support the 
profitability of their older clients.2 Thus, one would expect to find 
industries with lower number of active firms and bigger average firm 
size.  
On the other hand, other hypotheses support the idea that market 
power allows banks to establish long-term valuable relationship with 
their clients, to acquire better information on them and to sustain the 
cost of screening and established long-term relationships even with 
young and unknown (i.e. more risky) entrepreneurs (Petersen and 
Rajan, 1995). If this is possible only when banks have the expectation to 
recover the cost of starting a risky relationship (i.e. in non-competitive 
banking markets, see Section I.2), it is likely that in a more concentrated 
banking market banks may finance a higher number of entrants. One 
would thus expect to find industries with higher number of active 
firms and lower average firm size. 
                                                          
2 See Cestone and White (2004) for theoretical contributions on this specific 
point. 
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Given these contrasting theoretical perspectives, the impact of banking 
concentration on the market structure of manufacturing industries is 
mainly reduced to an empirical question. 
This study follows Cetorelli (2004), who focuses on a sample of EU 
countries, and Cetorelli and Strahan (2006), who analyze US local 
markets. They find that banking concentration is significantly 
associated with lower number of firms and bigger average firm size in 
non-financial sectors.   
We want to test whether there is a relationship between bank 
concentration and the market structure of manufacturing industries 
and, in particular, whether this relationship holds in countries with 
different level of economic development. 
The main question addressed in this paper are thus: Does bank 
concentration have an impact on the number and average size of firms 
in manufacturing industries? Does bank concentration have the same 
impact on the structure of manufacturing industries at any level of 
economic development? 
Financial system characteristics have differential impacts on industries 
(each having different technological needs and external finance 
dependence) and countries. Every country has different legal and 
regulatory frameworks that protect investors and banks market power, 
or different levels of information technology, economic and political 
stability as well as technological development, which imply different 
strategies for the lending relationship. At the same time, differences in 
the with-in-industry structure of real sectors imply different paths of 
capital accumulation and innovation.3  
For these reasons, it is important to analyze the relationship between 
bank concentration and the with-in-industry structure and to 
disentangle the effects across different industries and groups of 
countries. 
                                                          
3 See, for example, Cooley and Quadrini (2001) for a model of firm size 
dynamics with financial frictions and the literature therein. 
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For this purpose we follow the methodology introduced by Rajan-
Zingales (1998) in the literature on finance and growth. By interacting 
this an industry specific measure of external finance dependence with 
an indicator of the characteristic of a country’s financial system, we can 
differentiate the effects across industries and countries.  
Using data for 42 countries over the period 1993-2001, we investigate 
whether the relationship between bank concentration and the market 
structure of manufacturing sector is non-linear across different levels of 
economic development. 
In this essay the empirical results show that in high income countries 
higher levels of bank concentration are negatively associated with the 
number of manufacturing firms and positively associated with the 
average size of firms. By contrast, we find that in developing countries 
higher levels of bank concentration do not have a statistically 
significant effect on the market structure of manufacturing industries.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section I.2 briefly reviews 
the theoretical literature on the impact of bank concentration on the real 
sector, and reports the empirical evidence supporting the contrasting 
propositions in the literature so far. Section I.3 illustrates the data and 
the variables construction. Section I.4 describes the methodology we 
used in these analysis, and Section I.5 presents the model specification. 
Section I.6 comments on the benchmark results, with robustness checks 
conducted in section I.7. The last section concludes. 
 
I.2 REAL EFFECTS OF BANK CONCENTRATION: THEORETICAL 
BACKGROUND AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
This paper shows how the market structure of banking sector can affect 
the structure of real sectors.4 
                                                          
4 This section partly draws from previous studies on bank concentration and 
real economy, i.e., Guzman (2000), Cetorelli (2001),  Cetorelli and Gambera 
(2001), Beck et al. (2004), Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia (2004), and 
Cetorelli and Strahan (2006). 
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Early works in this area focuses on economic history and refer to early 
industrial period. During the early stages of industrialization some of 
the nowadays leading industrial countries were characterized by 
highly concentrated banking markets. Examples of this relationship are 
found for France and Germany (Gerschenkron, 1965), Italy (Cohen, 
1967), United States (Sylla, 1969), and Japan (Mayer, 1990). 
More recent theoretical and empirical contributions provide 
contradictory evidence, with mixed findings that can be used to 
support two opposite views. 
Following a standard approach based on the structure-conduct-
performance paradigm, one would support the idea that any deviation 
from perfect competition will result in lower supply and higher prices.5 
In other words, in a non-competitive market, banks take advantage of 
their market power to make profits by extracting higher rents from 
entrepreneurs (higher interest rates) and at the same time they offer an 
amount of credit that is lower than in a competitive market.6 
However, other hypotheses pay more attention to the role played by 
information asymmetries in the relationship between lenders and 
borrowers. Lenders have to face adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems, while borrowers can incur in hold-up problems. 
Petersen and Rajan (1995) show that young and unknown 
entrepreneurs (i.e., without any borrowing record) receive more credit 
in concentrated banking markets. They show that in a non-competitive 
environment, during the first period of the lending relationship (i.e., 
during the start-up process of the firm) a bank can claim lower interest 
rates. The bank maximizes an inter-temporal utility function; at early 
stages of the entrepreneurial activity a bank can lend at lower prices 
since it is confident that its market power will build a long term 
                                                          
5 A monopolist bank choose the quantity of its credit supply according to the 
standard condition of equality between the Lerner index and the inverse of 
elasticity (Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia, 2004). 
6 See for example Hannan (1991) for an analysis of the banking sector  structure 
based on the standard structure-conduct-performance paradigm. 
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relationship with entrepreneurs (that can incur in hold up problems) 
and, then, it extracts higher prices in the future.  
By contrast, in high competitive markets banks can experience free-
riding problems. In the first period of the lending relationship, a bank 
faces the costs to screen entrepreneurs and risks not to get these costs 
repaid. At the beginning of the second period of the lending 
relationship (i.e., when the entrepreneur repays the first debt and still 
needs more credit), the entrepreneur might ask for credit from another 
bank that charges lower interest rates, since the second bank has not 
sustained the initial screening costs. This free-riding behavior can result 
in a barrier to access to credit to young, but good, projects, resulting in 
a decline in credit supply to potentially successful entrepreneurial 
activities. 
Using a similar framework to understand the possible positive role of 
bank concentration on real economy performance, Cetorelli (1997) 
formalizes two general equilibrium models for capital accumulation in 
two extreme cases of perfect competition and monopoly in the banking 
market. He shows that under perfect competition the free-riding 
problem underlined in Petersen and Rajan (1995) can lead to banks 
abstaining from screening procedures. The cost of screening may 
prevent banks to screen entrepreneurs, in which case banks can only 
use risk diversification strategies to maximize their profits. In this 
scenario, banks finance a maximum number of projects, which would 
include a proportion of “bad” projects. 
The presence of an unscreened proportion of unsuccessful projects 
would have a negative effect on the economy, while beneficial effects 
may come from no rent extraction by competitive banks. 
In the monopolistic banking market the bank would resort the 
screening process and would finance (at the extreme) only good 
projects. The economy as a whole would benefit from firms being 
screened by the bank but, at the same time, bank’s monopolistic profits 
would have a negative effect on the economy. 
Cetorelli (1997) shows that the beneficial effects of the monopolistic 
regimes prevail only if there is a low proportion of good projects in the 
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economy and the available technology allows low-cost screening. He 
suggests that in developing countries the proportion of more risky and 
opaque entrepreneurs is much larger than in developed economies, 
given the lower quality of productive capital, knowledge, experience, 
infrastructure. Thus, if we associate these conditions with low income 
countries, bank concentration might not be a detrimental for those 
economies. However, the cost of screening may be relatively higher in 
developing countries, thus any beneficial effects of bank market power 
may be nullified.  
Both contending hypotheses concerning the effect of bank 
concentration on the real economy are supported by empirical 
evidence.7 
Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) observe a fall in loan prices following US 
branching deregulation. Black and Strahan (2002), analyzing the US 
banking markets, find higher rates of incorporation after branching and 
interstate banking liberalization. Beck et. al (2004) look at a sample of 
74 countries using firm level data, and find that bank concentration is 
associated with higher barrier to access to finance, especially in 
countries with low levels of institutional development.  Cetorelli and 
Strahan (2006) focus on the effects of competition in US local banking 
markets on the structure of non-financial sectors. They find that more 
competition in the US banking market positively affects the size and 
the number of firms (i.e. it reduces the typical size and increases the 
number of small and medium firms). 
Trying to provide evidence about the dominance of the information-
based hypothesis, Petersen and Rajan (1995) show that younger firms 
(which are assumed to be more credit constrained) receive more credit 
in concentrated rather than more competitive banking markets. 
Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) find that bank concentration is beneficial 
                                                          
7 A third alternative view focuses on the importance of the economies of scale, 
scope, and product in the banking sector. Greater bank concentration would 
allow the exploitation of increasing returns. However, the empirical evidence is 
contradictory and do not show sound evidence on cost efficiency by exploiting 
economies of scale and scope from consolidation processes. See, Demirgüç-
Kunt and Levine (2000) for a review of the empirical works on this point. 
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for the growth of sectors more dependent on external finance; however, 
they find that concentration is overall detrimental for growth. 
Bonaccorsi di Patti e Dell’Ariccia (2001) consider the role played by 
information in the lender-borrower relationship to be crucial. They look 
at the Italian local banking markets and find a non-monotonic 
relationship between banks’ market power and firm creation, within a 
range where banking market concentration is beneficial. They also 
argue that more opaque firms (i.e., firms that have a low proportion of 
physical capital) would benefit from concentrated banking sector. 
In the following section, we will rely on an updated dataset to 
disentangle the effects of bank concentration on the structure of 
manufacturing sectors by looking at countries at different level of 
economic development. 
 
I.3 DATA 
The economic literature offers some cross-country datasets that could 
have been used to investigate the particular question of this paper. For 
example, Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) and Deidda and Fattouh (2005) 
use the popular Rajan and Zingales (1998) dataset augmented with 
indicators of banking market concentration and efficiency. The Rajan 
and Zingales (1998) dataset contains a set of industrial sector variables8  
that come from the UNIDO (United Nation Industrial Development 
Organization) database for 36 manufacturing industry of 41 countries. 
However, the industrial variables (i.e. value added, number of 
establishments, and average establishments size) taken from the Rajan-
Zingales (1998) dataset refers to the period 1980-1990, and there are no 
available data regarding banking market concentration for years prior 
to 1989. Merging variables related to different periods might be a 
source of identification problems, therefore we do not use the data 
from Rajan and Zingales (1998) like Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) and 
                                                          
8 In addition it contains an indicators of industries’ external financial 
dependence and other country level financial, economic and regulatory 
variables. 
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Deidda and Fattouh (2005) have done. We believe this is an 
improvement respect to the previous literature. 
Moreover, this present study aims to extend the analysis to a more 
recent period (1993-2001) and to use annual data, since starting from 
the first half of the 1990s, many countries have experienced bank 
deregulation and competition reforms that have significantly changed 
the level of bank concentration. Using cross-country and cross-industry 
annual data has some costs, in that the UNIDO database is 
characterized by a consistent number of missing or unclean data.9 By 
applying a conscientious and plausible criterion for data cleaning the 
problems of the UNIDO dataset (especially relative to the number of 
establishments) seem to have been overcome.10 
In this analysis we use data for 27 sectors in 42 countries over nine 
years (1993-2001).11 
                                                          
9 The version used is INDSTAT3 on industrial statistics at the 3-digit level of 
Revision 2 of the International Standard Industrial classification of all economic 
activities (ISIC) contained in UNIDO INDSTAT32 2006 CD-Rom. It contains 
values for number of establishments, employment, wages and salaries, output, 
value added, gross fixed capital formation, number of female employees and 
production indexes. The values for each variables, in each country and 
industry, covers different years. 
10 The filter used in this analysis has dropped all those observations that have 
an annual growth rate greater than 300% for any of two dependent variables 
present in this work (i.e. industries’ number of establishments and industries’ 
establishments average size). The UNIDO database, especially for the 1990s, 
includes a relatively large number of observations that annually growth 
disproportionably. In order to avoid estimation problems, it seems plausible to 
apply such a filter. In fact, even if the disproportional variables’ growth is not 
related to errors, extremely high (or low) values of the number of establishment 
or the average establishment size relative to the other observation in the same 
country-industry may not be captured by country, industry, and year 
dummies. 
11 See Tables I.1, I.2, I.3, I.4, and I.5, at the end of this chapter, for a list of 
countries and industries and the summary statistics of both industrial and 
financial sectors variables. Data on industries and countries span for different 
periods depending on countries data availability. 
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All the industrial sector variables come from the UNIDO database; the 
two dependent variables, that is the industries number of 
establishments (No. Est.) and the average establishments size (Av. Size) 
- calculated as the ratio between the number of employees and the 
number of establishments for each industry in each country; and the 
industry share of value added (Sh) on total manufacturing for each 
country in each year is used as a control variable in all of our estimated 
models. 
It is important to note that it would have been preferable to use the 
number of firms instead of the number of establishment for computing 
the average size. It may be that larger firms have more than one 
establishment. However, Cetorelli (2001) shows that there is a strong 
and positive correlation between the number of establishments and the 
number of firms. The decision to look at the number of establishments 
as a proxy for the number of firms seems reasonable and is supported 
by previous studies that have faced the same problem (for example, 
Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Cetorelli, 2001; Cetorelli and Gambera, 2001; 
Fisman and Sarria-Allende, 2004; Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006). 12 
For the financial system variables we use data from the most recent 
version (update to 2006) of Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2000) 
dataset on financial development and structure. 
From this dataset we use the private credit to GDP (Cr) (widely used in 
the literature as a proxy for the depth of banking market) and an 
indicator of bank concentration (Conc) that is calculated as the share of 
the three largest banks on the total assets of all commercial banks (i.e. 
C3 ratio).13 
The full sample of countries is split in two sub-samples according to the 
World Bank income classification, on which the model is estimated 
separately.14 
                                                          
12 In this essay we indifferently refer to average establishment size and firm 
size. 
13 Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2000) calculated this indicator from the 
Fitch’s BankScope database. 
14 Namely, under our category “high” income countries we include the World 
Bank’s “OECD high income countries” and “non-OECD high income 
11 
 
I.4 METHODOLOGY 
The conjecture we test follows Cetorelli (2004) (who analyze EU 
countries) and Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) (who focus on US local 
markets). Similarly we use the Rajan-Zingales (1998) methodology to 
identify the relationship between bank concentration and the structure 
of manufacturing industries and to take into account possible 
endogeneity and omitted variable problems.  
As Rajan and Zingales (1998) state, industries differ from each other in 
their dependence on sources of external finance. These differences are 
based on industry-specific technological factors.  
To capture these differences across sectors, we have based our analysis 
on the Rajan-Zingales (1998) methodology. The main hypothesis is that 
a more developed financial system would facilitate access to sources of 
external finance. By interacting the financial variable of interest (bank 
concentration, which is a country-time specific variable) with an 
industry specific indicator (the Rajan- Zingales (1998) indicator of the 
need of external sources of finance of a given sector), we can 
differentiate the effects across industries.  
The identification strategy in this paper is based on the idea that 
whether bank concentration (or other financial variables) has a positive 
or negative effect on real sector performance, then these effects should 
be more important in industry that are relatively more dependent on 
external finance.  
Given the opposing theoretical views about the role of bank 
concentration on real economy, one might expect that firms in 
industries more dependent on external finance would suffer (or benefit) 
more in countries with concentrated banking markets.15  
                                                                                                                               
countries” categories. While our category “low” income country include the 
rest of the country income groups. Estimations have been conducted for any 
country income group and the results roughly confirm the ones obtained 
splitting the sample in only 2 groups. Deidda and Fottouh (2005) follows a 
similar sample splitting. 
15 Rajan and Zingales (1998) use a sample of 36 industries across 41 countries, 
and consider the sum of stock market capitalization and domestic credit over 
12 
 
Consistent with a large number of studies in the literature on finance 
and growth, our analysis uses this methodology and employs the 
original indicator of external finance dependence calculated by Rajan 
and Zingales (1998). This indicator reflects the average amount of 
capital expenditure not financed with internal cash flows for the 
median firm in a given manufacturing industry in the United States 
during the 1980s. Rajan and Zingales (1998) justify the choice of 
calculating this indicator for US firms by arguing that data on external 
financing are typically not available and, furthermore, in other 
countries they would reflect differences between supply and demand 
of credit. Calculating this indicator for US firms present in the stock 
market (which is considered the most competitive market) allows us to 
reduce the potential problems due to supply and demand present in 
other countries. Therefore, US firms choose their optimal amount of 
external funding to technological reasons and are not influenced (or, at 
least, less influenced) by credit supply constraints. 
The strongest assumption in the framework of the Rajan-Zingales 
(1998) methodology is perhaps that industry’s technological needs are 
assumed to be the same across countries. In their original work, Rajan 
and Zingales (1998) show that external finance needs are likely to be 
the same across countries in relative terms (i.e. if compared to the other 
industries of the same country). 
This methodology offers important advantages for an analysis of the 
mechanisms through which finance influences growth. It helps to avoid 
problems of misspecification or omitted variables, becasue it takes into 
account country and industry (and here time) fixed effects, in trying to 
isolate the relation between bank concentration and the dependent 
variable. Furthermore, by including the share of the industries on total 
value added, we control for the relative importance of each sector. 
                                                                                                                               
GDP in addition to accounting standards as indicators of a country’s financial 
development. They find that the coefficient on the interaction term between the 
financial development variable and the industry indicator of external finance is  
positive and statistically significant at the one percent level. They argue that 
firms external finance dependence is a channel through which finance financial 
system development impacts on real economy. 
13 
 
Finally, the Rajan-Zingales methodology has the crucial advantage of 
offering a way to mitigate the problems related to endogeneity that can 
characterize the relationship between finance and real sector 
performance. Since the indicator of external financial dependence is 
calculated for US firms, it enters as exogenous in a cross country study 
(where the United States is excluded). 
In this essay the industry indicator of external finance (Ext) is drawn 
from Klingebiel et al. (2007) who computed the indicator following the 
original Rajan-Zingales (1998) procedure, but ensures compatibly with 
an ISIC 3-digit industry aggregation, which matches our industry 
aggregation.16 
 
I.5 ESTIMATED EQUATIONS 
The underlying idea of the specifications is to test whether market 
structure of banking sector has an impact on the structure of the 
industrial sectors. Following the Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
methodology, we interact the bank concentration variable (Conc) with 
an industry-specific indicator of external finance dependence (Ext) in 
two different models: the first having the number of establishment in 
the manufacturing sectors and the second the average establishment 
size.  
The first model is specified as follows: 
 
Ln(No.Estc,i,t)=β0+β1(Shc,i,t)+β2(Concc,t*Exti) + θ1Cc+ θ2Ii+ θ3Tt+εc,i,t 
 
where the dependent variable is (the natural log of) the number of 
establishments in each sector i for each country c at time t. The 
independent variables are the share of value added of each sector on 
the total value added of the manufacturing sector (Sh), which controls 
                                                          
16 The indicator refers to the 1980s. We have also tried to employ the indicator 
constructed by Klingebiel et al. (2007) for the period 1980-2000 and we obtain 
similar results. 
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for the relative importance of each sector i for each country c at time t, 
and our crucial variable of interest (Conc*Ext), which is the measure of 
bank concentration (Conc) for each country c at time t interacted with 
the indicator of external financial dependence (Ext) of each sector i. By 
including country, industry and year dummies (C, I, T), we control for 
fixed effects that might bias the identification of our variable of 
interests. 
Giving the contrasting theoretical hypothesis, if bank concentration is a 
constraint to entry of new firms in highly external finance dependent 
sectors, we would expect a negative sign of the interacted bank 
concentration parameter; conversely, if bank concentration is associated 
with a higher number of firms, the coefficient of interest would be 
positive and significant.17 
The dependent variable of the second model specification is the 
average establishment size in each sector i for each country c at time t, 
while the right-hand side is the same than the first specification. 
  
Ln(Av.Sizec,i,t)=β0+β1(Shc,i,t)+β2(Concc,t*Exti) + θ1Cc+ θ2Ii+ θ3Tt+εc,i,t 
 
Here, the hypothesis tested is that if bank concentration is a barrier to 
access to finance, then this barrier would be larger for new and smaller 
firms, so we would expect a higher average firm size, especially, in 
those sectors that rely more on sources of external finance. 
  
 
 
                                                          
17 It should be noted that in this specification the direct effect of bank 
concentration is not identified because it is fully absorbed by country and year 
dummies variables, similarly to the direct effect of external finance 
dependence, which is absorbed by the industries dummies since it would be 
fully absorbed by country and years dummies. This specification allows us to 
capture second order effects of bank concentration on different industries. 
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I.6 ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Two tests are used to assess differences across the two groups of 
countries. The Wald test that tests the null hypothesis of equality 
between the two interacted bank concentration coefficients of the two 
groups of countries. The Chow test that assess the null hypothesis of 
equality between the coefficients of all the independent variables 
(except country dummies) of the two groups of countries.18 We show 
the results of these tests any time we change the model specification 
(Tables I.6, I.9, I.10a, and I.10b). Results of the Chow tests reject the null 
hypothesis of equality of all the coefficients for any model specification. 
They confirm that we should separately estimate our model for the two 
sub-samples and that there is a different relationship between bank 
concentration and number of establishments or average establishment 
size for the two country groups with differing income levels. Results of 
Wald tests also reject the equality between the bank concentration 
coefficients in the two groups of countries.   
Estimation results using OLS show a negative and significant 
coefficient for the bank concentration term (interacted with the 
indicator of external finance dependence) in the sub-sample of high-
income countries when the dependent variable is the (log of) number of 
establishments (Table I.6 column 3). By contrast, the bank concentration 
interaction coefficient is not statistically significant for low income 
countries (Table I.6 column 2).  
Table I.6 columns 4-6 show the OLS estimation results of our analysis 
using the other dependent variable, the (log of) average firm size. As in 
the previous regressions, the coefficients of the interacted bank 
concentration variable display statistically significant effects in the sub-
sample of high income countries only. In low income countries, the 
coefficient relative to bank concentration significant and negative. 
In order to give a clearer idea of the magnitude and economic 
significance of the interaction terms’ coefficients, Rajan and Zingales 
(1998), and other empirical works using this methodology, suggest to 
illustrate a simple example. 
                                                          
18 See for example Wooldridge (2001) pages 237-240. 
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Firstly, recall that the estimated models are semi-log models, where the 
dependent variable is expressed as natural logarithm of number of 
establishments and average establishments size and the bank 
concentration interacted term is linear. 
Secondly, in the benchmark model of our analysis (Table I.6), the 
coefficients of the interaction terms for the high-income countries sub-
sample estimations are roughly -2.5 and +0.5 for the models with (the 
natural log of) the number of establishments (No. Est) and (the natural 
log of) the average establishments size (Av. Size), respectively, as 
dependent variables.  
Lastly, consider that the industry at the 75th percentile of financial 
dependence was located in a context (country and year) at the 75th 
percentile of bank concentration, rather than in a context at the 25th 
percentile of bank concentration. And finally, consider the same switch 
of context for the industry at the 25th percentile of financial 
development.19 
In our example these changes lead to a decrease in (the log of) the 
number of establishments by -0.225 and an increase in (the log of) 
average establishments size by 0.045. Considering that the average 
values for all industries, countries and years in high-income countries 
are 5.9 and 3.3 for (the log of) the number of establishments and (the 
log of) the average establishments size, respectively, the effects of bank 
concentration are quite important.  
The fact that bank concentration may enhance industrial sector 
concentration has not received much attention in the economic 
literature, but is at the origin of possible endogeneity problems that 
might be affecting the analysis. In some countries there might be a 
                                                          
19 Mathematically, our example means: Coeff *(Ext75*(Conc75-Conc25)-
Ext25*(Conc75-Conc25) or Coeff*(Conc75-Conc25)*(Ext75-Ext25), where Coeff 
is the estimated coefficient, Ext75 and Ext25 are the values of the external 
finance dependence variable at the 75th and 25th  percentile of its distribution, 
respectively, while Conc75 and Conc25 are the values of the bank concentration 
variable at the 75th and 25th percentile of its country-year distribution, 
respectively. Substituting the values of our examples: -2.5*(0.90-0.65)*(0.4-0.04)= 
-0.225 
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concentration of economic power (ownership) in the hands of small 
groups that have interests in industrial sectors but that also control 
banks (or vice versa). This reverse mechanism problem as well as the 
fact that bank concentration might adjust to best fit the industrial 
characteristics of a country are the two main sources of possible 
endogeneity. Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) argue that bank 
concentration typically does not adjust to other industry characteristics 
but is determined by other independent factors (i.e. government policy 
during severe financial repression). Furthermore, the Rajan-Zingales 
(1998) methodology should mitigate endogeneity problems through the 
interaction of the suspected endogenous variable (bank concentration) 
with an exogenous industry-specific index of external finance 
dependence. However a more accurate investigation of endogeneity is 
warranted. 
The literature offers some variables that can be used to instrument bank 
concentration in models that have proxies of the structure of industrial 
sectors as dependent variables. For example country legal origin 
variables which reflect different rules and regulation that can 
determine market structure;20 or, an indicator of the regulatory 
restrictions on banks’ activities in non-financial markets.21  
                                                          
20 La Porta et al. (1998) show that the origin of a country legal system can be a 
good instrument of financial development, since finance operates through 
contracts. A country can have a British, German, French, or Scandinavian legal 
system and this reflects differing levels of protection of creditor rights and the 
associated enforceability. The correlation of the legal system with financial 
development is conceptually straightforward: better laws (which protect and 
enforce investors’ rights) create a better environment for financial market 
development. In most countries legal systems are imported from foreign 
experiences or were imposed during colonization; so there are strong 
arguments to consider this variable as exogenous. See also Beck and Demirgüç-
Kunt (2005) for a work about the links between country legal system and firms’ 
access to finance. They find that the adaptability of a legal system is more 
important in explaining firms obstacles to access to finance than the than the 
political independence of the judiciary. 
21 It may be the case that in highly concentrated banking markets, banks have 
strong political power and may influence the regulation. Demirgüç-Kunt and 
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However, the data used in this work have also a time dimension. This 
is a source of problems to find good instruments with a time 
dimension, potentially related to the institutional and regulatory 
framework.22 
We therefore decide to use the 5-year lagged values of bank 
concentration in order to ensure exogeneity of the instruments and 
exploit the time dimension of our data.23   
In Table I.7 we show the statistics of the endogeneity test that tests the 
null hypothesis that the suspected endogenous regressor (bank 
concentration) can actually be treated as exogenous.24 We report OLS 
estimation when the test does not reject the null hypothesis. The 
estimation results confirm that in high income countries higher bank 
concentration is associated with lower number of firms and bigger 
average firm size. While, we do not find a statistically significant 
relationship between bank concentration and number of firm and 
average firm size in low income countries. 25 
Combining the results, we find support for the idea that, even after 
controlling for country, industries, and year fixed effects as well as for 
the industries relative importance in the country, a more concentrated 
banking market is associated with a lower number of establishments 
and a bigger average establishment size in industries that are more 
dependent on external finance. We find this relationship for the group 
                                                                                                                               
Levine (2000) find that bank concentration is negatively associated with 
restrictiveness on bank activities. 
22 Only for more recent periods is possible to find good instruments for bank 
concetration with time dimension. 
23 Also this choice has the cost of losing some observation observations since 
the data series for bank concentration is not complete.  
24 The test statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal 
to the number of tested regressors. It is a version of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
robust to various violations of conditional homoskedasticity. 
25 One may raise doubts about identification since we are using annual data and 
we do not use lagged independent variables. However, we have tried to 
include in our model lagged variables. The result show similar results. 
However, we believe that further research is needed on this point. 
19 
 
of high income countries, while we do not find a significant (or stable) 
relationship in the group of low income countries. 
This suggests that bank concentration has not in itself a determinant of 
the non-financial market structure, but it seems to have different effects 
for different levels of economic development. The level of economic 
development, which is likely to be associated with the economy’s 
institutional, regulatory and overall macroeconomic framework, might 
have an important role while defining the relationship between bank 
concentration and the structure of manufacturing sectors.  
High income countries have more developed financial and legal 
systems that may provide better information sharing and creditors 
rights protection, and more stable economicand political  
environmeant.  
Trying to interpret these results in light of the contending hypotheses 
about the real effects of bank concentration,  in these countries the 
beneficial effects of bank market power, seen in part of the literature as 
a means to reduce asymmetric information problems, may not offset 
the costs of a non-competitive credit market, which is likely to be 
associated with higher interest rates and lower supply of credit. 
In low income countries there appears to be a non-significant 
relationship between bank concentration and the structure of 
manufacturing sectors. This may be explained by the fact that some 
institutional, regulatory, technological factors, also beyond the financial 
system, are more important determinants of the market structure of 
manufacturing sectors.  
 
I.6 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
I.6.1 Outliers 
One might argue that the estimation results are driven by the presence 
of outlying values. To ensure the robustness of the previous results, for 
all the model specifications and for both dependent variables, the 
sample is restricted to the interval within the 5th and the 95th percentile 
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of the country-year distribution (calculated for each sub-sample) of the 
bank concentration variable. 
As showed in Table I.8, the results obtained dropping the tails of the 
country-year distributions of bank concentration in both income groups 
confirm our previous findings.26  
A further approach to control for outliers is to estimate robust 
regressions. We estimate the two baseline models with iteratively 
reweighted least squared (IRLS). The estimation results in Table I.8 
show that the main findings are not changed. 
 
I.6.2 Augmented model 
In order to check the stability of the bank concentration estimated 
parameters, we run additional regressions (Table I.9), augmenting the 
models with an measure of the depth of credit markets (i.e. banking 
private credit to GDP) variables that might also affect the industrial 
structure. 
This variable can capture the effect of the quantity of credit available in 
the economy and, more generally, it may capture the effects of the legal 
and regulatory determinants of development of private credit.27 
We find that in high-income countries private credit to GDP is 
positively associated with a higher number of establishments, while it 
has not a statistically significant effect on the average establishments 
size.  
A possible interpretation of this finding does not differ much from the 
one used for the effect of bank concentration. 
                                                          
26 Recall that because of data problems with the industrial variables from 
UNIDO, we have used a filter that dropped all the observations that have an 
annual growth rate greater than 300%. Further robustness checks with a more 
restrictive filter (annual growth greater than 100%) confirm the results obtained 
with the less restrictive filter. The estimation results are available upon request. 
27 See for example Djankov et al. (2007). 
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In high-income countries, entrants may take advantage from more 
credit availability and enter the market. At the same time, incumbents 
also take advantage of the higher credit availability: however, the more 
competitive market conditions may lead some of them (likely 
inefficient ones) to leave the market. An improvement in the aggregate 
quantity of available credit is likely to be associated with 
improvements in the institutional and regulatory framework (e.g. 
better information sharing, creditor rights protection, regulation of 
banks activities, or removal of legal barriers and impediments to bank 
competition). In this framework banks may not have the incentive to 
hold lending relationship with inefficient incumbents.  
In low income countries, the private credit does not seem to have a 
significant effect on the number of establishments, while it appears to 
be positively associated with average establishment size. It is possible 
that firms take advantage of more credit availability and expand their 
business, while smaller firms and new entrants may be constrained by 
other important barriers to entry and business expansion. 
 
I.6.3 Country and industry trends 
To control for country and industry specific annual shocks we estimate 
different models that includes country trend dummies (a dummy for 
each country in each year, Table I.10a) and industry and country trend 
dummies (a dummy for each industry in each year and for each 
country in each year, Table I.10b).28 
This choice is costly in terms of the loss of degrees of freedom, but it 
allows improving controls for country or industry specific annual 
                                                          
28 In the interest of space and easier reading only estimations for the benchmark 
models are reported. However, all the model specifications have been 
estimated using these three sets of country and industry trends. Furthermore, 
all of the model specification and all of the three combination of country and 
industry trends were estimated regression dropping the tails (lowest and 
highest 5 percentiles of the country year distribution of the bank concentration 
variable. The estimation results do not change the findings illustrated so far. 
Results are available upon request. 
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shocks. One may argue that the model does not fully control for other 
factors having the same dimensionality since the main independent 
variable has two dimensions of variability (country and time). The 
results show similar results.29 
 
I.7 CONCLUSION 
In this study we analyzed the relationship between bank concentration 
and the structure of manufacturing sectors in two groups of countries 
with different levels of development during the period 1993-2001.  
There are theoretical and empirical studies that support two 
contrasting views about the real effects of bank concentration. On one 
hand, theories based on the structure-conduct-performance paradigm 
suggest that banks with market power may restrict the supply of credit 
to firms, especially for firms willing to enter in the markets, while they 
may have “preferential agreements” with older clients (i.e. 
incumbents). In a concentrated banking market, banks have the 
incentive to lend to incumbents and to limit the access to credit to new 
                                                          
29 In order to check the sensitivity of our findings to time variability, it is 
important to estimate the benchmark models as a cross section for each year. 
Clearly, this choice implies a different number of countries for each year, since 
(as noted above) each country is present for different years in the panel (see 
Table I.1). Furthermore, for this reason and for the fact that the dependent 
variables as well as the indicator of bank concentration have important 
variability during the time period of the analysis, a cross section of average 
values during the entire time period does not seem to be correct. In any case, 
this analysis broadly reaches the same conclusions. The estimation results for 
the cross section estimates for each year are consistent with the panel 
estimations in 7 out 9 years of the analysis for the benchmark model having as 
a dependent variable the number of establishments. The estimation results are 
available upon request. It should be recalled that the choice of the countries 
previously used is dictated by data availability; only very small countries as 
Barbados, Mauritius and Trinidad and Tobago have been dropped. 
Furthermore, the regression models have been tested for several different 
samples: for example, looking at those countries that have observations for at 
least for 2, 3 or more years during the period of analysis. The same results are 
confirmed and are available upon request. 
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entrants. This is to limit product market competition that may have a 
effect on the performance of their “older” clients. While in a 
competitive banking market banks may not have the incentive to hold 
inefficient relationship independently from whether the firm is an 
incumbent or a new firms. The prediction support by this strand of the 
literature is that banking market concentration is likely to be associated 
with lower number of firm and bigger average firm size. 
On the other hand, theories focusing on the “information channel” 
suggest that banks act as information producers and that banks with 
market power may be able to sustain the cost of lending the unknown 
and risky entrepreneurs if there is there is expectation to establish 
profitable long term lending relationships. Here, the prediction is that 
bank market power may to be associated with larger number of 
competitors and smaller average firm size in non-financial sectors. 
The results of the present analysis show that a higher level of bank 
concentration is associated with a lower number of firms and with 
bigger average firm size in those manufacturing sectors that rely more 
on sources of external finance only in high income countries. 
These results are consistent with previous studies analyzing this 
relationship in different samples of developed economies. 
We offer an interpretation of our results in the light of the contending 
views about the real effects of bank concentration.  
These findings for high-income countries suggest that the first force 
may prevail as higher bank concentration is associated with industries’ 
lower number of firms and bigger average firm size. Higher level of 
economic development is likely to be associated with better disclosure 
laws, higher levels of accounting standards, increased legal protection 
of creditors, better law enforcement, information technologies, more 
efficient managements, and less risky economic environments. This 
framework might allow banks to obtain sufficient information and 
protection in order to efficiently allocate their credit.  
The beneficial effect that may be associated with bank market power, 
through the smoothing of asymmetric information problems, may not 
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offset the costs of a non-competitive credit market, which is likely to be 
associated with higher interest rates and lower supply of credit. 
What seems to be important in high income countries is the availability 
of credit at lower interest rates, which are likely to be offered in less 
concentrated banking markets.  
In these countries higher levels of bank concentration lead to a scarce 
dynamism in the manufacturing sectors. As found in a large part of the 
literature, firm size dynamics are scale dependent, in the sense that 
smaller firms tend to grow faster than larger firms, and that exit rates 
decline with the average size of firms in a sector.30   
In low income countries the fact that bank concentration is not  
significantly associated with the market structure of non-financial 
sectors might suggest that other forces are important determinants and 
this has different policy implication. 
The World Bank Doing Business indicators shows that in these 
countries massive reforms are needed to lower the barriers to 
entrepreneurship which may arise from aspects besides the access to 
credit, such as, for example, the improvement of infrastructures, 
protection of investor and property rights, contract enforcement, the 
legal requirements to open and close a business and to trade 
internationally.  
These countries should focus on the improvement of their regulatory 
and institutional environment and ownership structure rather than on 
the bank concentration per se, which has been for long time at the centre 
of the policy debate, however might not play a primary role on the real 
economy (Demirgüç-Kunt, 2006).31  
 
                                                          
30 See, for example, Cooley and Quadrini (2001) for a model of firm size 
dynamics with financial frictions and the literature therein. 
31 In a recent studies on the determinants of private credit development, 
Djankov et al. (2007) show that information sharing has a positive impact only 
in low income countries. This finding has a similar policy implication, even if 
he analyzes the problem from a different point of view. In fact, it suggests that 
reforms in this direction should be undertaken by developing countries. 
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APPENDIX AT ESSAY I: TABLES OF SUMMARY STATISTICS AND 
RESULTS 
 
Table I.1 The table shows the number of sectors and total observations for countries during the 
period 1993-2001.  
 
HIGH INCOME 
Country Year  
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Tot. 
Austria 27 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 54 
Canada 27 27 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 236 
Cyprus 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 25 208 
Greece 0 23 23 23 23 23 0 0 0 115 
Hong Kong 23 23 23 23 24 0 0 0 0 116 
Iceland 0 0 16 16 0 0 0 0 0 32 
Israel 24 24 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 187 
Japan 0 0 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 189 
Korea, Rep. 27 27 27 26 27 27 27 27 27 242 
Kuwait 0 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 22 169 
Malta 0 0 23 23 0 0 0 0 0 46 
Netherlands 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 
Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 24 
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 0 26 
UK 0 0 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 
Tot. 177 195 254 228 191 167 144 169 171 1,696 
LOW INCOME 
Argentina 0 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 
Bangladesh 0 0 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 24 
Bolivia 0 0 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 
Botswana 8 8 8 0 0 0 4 4 4 36 
Brazil 17 17 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 51 
Chile 27 27 27 27 27 27 0 0 0 162 
Colombia 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 0 0 189 
Costa Rica 26 0 0 0 26 25 24 24 24 149 
Cote d'Ivoire 0 0 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 
Ecuador 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 25 50 
El Salvador 0 0 0 0 22 22 0 0 0 44 
India 27 27 27 27 27 0 0 0 0 135 
Indonesia 26 26 26 27 0 0 24 24 24 177 
Iran 0 0 0 0 26 26 26 26 26 130 
Jordan 25 24 24 25 25 25 0 0 12 160 
Kenya 20 20 0 20 19 17 19 21 18 154 
Malaysia 0 27 23 27 27 0 0 25 26 155 
Mexico 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 
Nigeria 14 19 17 20 0 0 0 0 0 70 
Oman 0 18 19 17 19 22 21 23 21 160 
Panama 19 19 0 0 19 18 18 17 0 110 
Philippines 27 27 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 81 
Sri Lanka 0 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 208 
Thailand 0 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 
Tunisia 0 20 19 20 17 0 0 0 0 76 
Venezuela 26 27 27 27 24 0 0 0 0 131 
Zimbabwe 25 25 25 24 0 0 0 0 0 99 
Tot. 339 438 382 314 331 259 189 215 206 2,673 
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Table I.2 The table shows summary statistics for high-income and low-income countries. No.Est. is 
number of establishments in industry i, country c at time t. Av.Size is the average establishment size in 
industry i, country c at time t. Sh is the share of sector value added over the total manufacturing in 
industry i, country c at time t. Conc is an index of bank concentration (the share of the three largest 
banks on the total assets of all commercial banks) in country c at year t. (i.e C3 ratio). Cr is private 
credit to GDP in country c at time t. 
 
Variable Mean sd p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 
 HIGH INCOME 
No.Est. 2567.90 6349.15 13 79 400 1909 12557 
Av.Size 50.12 72.92 3.63 15.29 27.68 55.96 189.75 
Sh 0.04 0.042 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.12 
Conc 0.70 0.17 0.46 0.53 0.72 0.87 0.97 
Cr 0.75 0.31 0.30 0.54 0.67 0.91 1.32 
 LOW INCOME 
No.Est. 595.82 1678.30 6 36 118 448 2508 
Av.Size 108.23 130.25 9.9 34.36 65 130.07 358.09 
Sh 0.041 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.14 
Conc 0.67 0.19 0.39 0.51 0.65 0.80 0.97 
Cr 0.34 0.22 0.10 0.18 0.26 0.47 0.83 
 
Table I.3 The table shows simple average values for high-income and low-income countries over 
the period 1993-2001 for the financial variables used in this analysis. Conc is an index of bank 
concentration (the share of the three largest banks on the total assets of all commercial banks) in 
country c at year t. (i.e. C3 ratio). Cr is private credit to GDP in country c at time t.. 
 
HIGH INCOME LOW INCOME 
Country  Conc BankCr Country  Conc BankCr 
Austria 0.72 0.90 Argentina 0.43 0.18 
Canada 0.59 0.62 Bangladesh 0.60 0.22 
Cyprus 0.92 0.86 Bolivia 0.68 0.44 
Greece 0.93 0.32 Botswana 0.97 0.14 
Hong Kong 0.79 1.41 Brazil 0.65 0.27 
Iceland 1.00 0.46 Chile 0.56 0.47 
Israel 0.76 0.66 Colombia 0.45 0.17 
Japan 0.47 1.16 Costa Rica 0.77 0.17 
Korea. Rep. 0.48 0.59 Cote d’Ivoire 0.93 0.19 
Kuwait 0.69 0.40 Ecuador 0.48 0.30 
Malta 0.97 0.89 El Salvador 0.96 0.39 
Netherlands 0.91 0.84 India 0.39 0.22 
Norway 0.86 0.68 Indonesia 0.64 0.38 
Spain 0.81 0.90 Iran 0.97 0.18 
UK 0.60 1.10 Jordan 0.88 0.64 
   Kenya 0.62 0.22 
   Malaysia 0.50 0.84 
   Mexico 0.77 0.29 
   Nigeria 0.70 0.11 
   Oman 0.81 0.34 
   Panama 0.42 0.70 
   Philippines 0.88 0.27 
   Sri Lanka 0.74 0.24 
   Thailand 0.60 0.81 
   Tunisia 0.51 0.50 
   Venezuela 0.66 0.10 
   Zimbabwe 0.84 0.20 
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Table I.4 The table shows simple average values for high income countries over the period 1993-
2001 for the industrial variable used in this analysis. No. Est. is the number of establishments in 
industry i, country c at time t. Av. Size is the average establishment size in industry i, country c at time 
t. Sh is the share of sector value added over the total manufacturing in industry i, country c at time t. 
Ext is the industry indicator of external finance dependence, calculated for 3-digit ISIC industries by 
Klingebiel et al. (2007) following Rajan-Zingales (1998). 
 
HIGH INCOME 
ISIC code Industry No.  Est. Av. Size Share Ext 
      
311 Food products 6327.5634 33.95 0.11 0.14 
313 Beverages 458.48 123.28 0.03 0.08 
314 Tobacco 14.55 212.80 0.03 -0.45 
321 Textile 4476.55 27.85 0.04 0.40 
322 Apparel 3757.04 21.77 0.04 0.03 
323 Leather 586.95 16.45 0.00 -0.14 
324 Footwear 602.96 33.18 0.01 -0.08 
331 Wood products 3315.62 17.47 0.02 0.28 
332 Furniture 2066.63 16.50 0.02 0.24 
341 Paper and products 1584.94 52.37 0.03 0.18 
342 Printing and publishing 4699.06 23.78 0.05 0.20 
352 Other chemicals 1017.56 48.67 0.04 0.22 
353 Petroleum refineries 95.14 218.60 0.02 0.04 
354 Petroleum and coal products 255.34 30.41 0.00 0.33 
355 Rubber plastics 523.41 51.00 0.01 0.23 
356 Plastic products 3078.01 34.41 0.03 1.14 
361 Pottery 601.34 23.45 0.01 -0.15 
362 Glass 318.05 36.94 0.01 0.53 
369 Nonmetal products 2628.69 25.03 0.04 0.06 
371 Iron and steel 822.75 93.91 0.03 0.09 
372 Nonferrous metal 711.26 74.24 0.02 0.01 
381 Metal products 8122.44 18.37 0.06 0.24 
382 Machinery 7440.25 50.97 0.06 0.45 
383 Electric machinery 4058.54 52.91 0.10 0.77 
384 Transportation equipment 2211.11 77.56 0.07 0.31 
385 Professional goods 1609.57 37.79 0.03 0.96 
390 Other industries 2226.87 17.44 0.01 0.47 
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Table I.5 The table shows simple average values for low income countries over the period 1993-
2001 for the industrial variable used in this analysis. No.  Est. is the number of establishments in 
industry i, country c at time t. Av. Size is the average establishment size in industry i, country c at time 
t. Sh is the share of sector value added over the total manufacturing in industry i, country c at time t. 
Ext is the industry indicator of external finance dependence, calculated for 3-digit ISIC industries by 
Klingebiel et al. (2007) following Rajan-Zingales (1998). 
 
LOW INCOME 
ISIC code Industry No. Est. Av. Size Share Ext 
      
311 Food products 2623.42 72.85 0.18 0.14 
313 Beverages 137.58 141.51 0.07 0.08 
314 Tobacco 847.44 216.19 0.05 -0.45 
321 Textile 1351.20 132.38 0.05 0.40 
322 Apparel 1006.46 112.40 0.05 0.03 
323 Leather 136.52 61.62 0.01 -0.14 
324 Footwear 170.24 141.90 0.01 -0.08 
331 Wood products 648.25 63.07 0.02 0.28 
332 Furniture 598.71 50.99 0.01 0.24 
341 Paper and products 251.13 108.66 0.03 0.18 
342 Printing and publishing 524.95 54.82 0.03 0.20 
352 Other chemicals 516.54 80.27 0.06 0.22 
353 Petroleum refineries 24.68 385.20 0.10 0.04 
354 Petroleum and coal products 69.85 57.86 0.00 0.33 
355 Rubber plastics 298.85 105.10 0.02 0.23 
356 Plastic products 467.88 73.76 0.03 1.14 
361 Pottery 146.82 159.45 0.01 -0.15 
362 Glass 73.13 116.22 0.01 0.53 
369 Nonmetal products 1136.19 60.20 0.06 0.06 
371 Iron and steel 341.65 169.39 0.04 0.09 
372 Nonferrous metal 223.82 138.16 0.03 0.01 
381 Metal products 1179.47 48.76 0.04 0.24 
382 Machinery 843.66 68.50 0.03 0.45 
383 Electric machinery 511.24 141.85 0.05 0.77 
384 Transportation equipment 542.52 111.04 0.05 0.31 
385 Professional goods 130.69 115.14 0.00 0.96 
390 Other industries 261.19 51.28 0.04 0.47 
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Table I.6 OLS estimation results for the full sample of 42 countries (FULL) and the two sub-samples 
of low income (LOW) and high income (HIGH) countries. In columns 1-3 the dependent variables is 
the (natural logarithm of the) number of establishments in industry i, country c at year t. In columns 4-
6 the dependent variable is the (natural log of the) average establishment size in industry i, country c 
at year t. Sh is the share of sector value added over the total manufacturing in industry i, country c at 
time t. Conc is an index of bank concentration (the share of the three largest banks on the total assets 
of all commercial banks) in country c at year t. Ext is an indicator of external finance dependence for 
each industry i, defined following Rajan-Zingales (1998). C, I, and Y are province, industry, and year 
dummies, respectively. 
 
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent Ln (No. Est.) Ln (Av. Size) 
Sample FULL LOW HIGH FULL LOW HIGH 
Sh 
7.132*** 5.393*** 9.721*** 2.709*** 2.712*** 4.933*** 
(0.586) (0.540) (0.800) (0.332) (0.425) (0.458) 
Conc*Ext 
-0.837*** -0.252 -2.586*** -0.273 -0.482** 0.480** 
(0.230) (0.271) (0.289) (0.183) (0.242) (0.214) 
Constant 
-0.771** 4.026*** -0.042 5.111*** 4.184*** 6.611*** 
(0.364) (0.308) (0.192) (0.231) (0.229) (0.136) 
C Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
I Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Y Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 4369 2673 1696 4369 2673 1696 
R-squared 0.845 0.820 0.905 0.706 0.641 0.788 
Wald test  0.000  0.003 
Chow test  0.000  0.000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Wald test tests the null hypothesis of equality between Conc*Ext coefficients of the two groups of 
countries. P-values are reported. 
Chow test tests the null hypothesis of equality between the coefficients of all the independent 
variables (except country dummies) of the two groups of countries. P-values are reported. 
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Table I.7 IV and OLS estimation results. We report OLS estimations when the test does not reject 
the null hypothesis that the suspect endogenous regressor can actually be treated as exogenous. 
Estimation results are reported for the two sub-samples of low income (LOW) and high income 
(HIGH) countries. In columns 1-2 the dependent variable is the (natural logarithm of the) number of 
establishments in industry i, country c at year t. In columns 3-4 the dependent variable is the (natural 
logarithm of the) average establishment size in industry i, country c at year t. Sh is the share of sector 
value added over the total manufacturing in industry i, country c at time t. Conc is an index of bank 
concentration (the share of the three largest banks on the total assets of all commercial banks) in 
country c at year t. Ext is an indicator of external finance dependence for each industry i, defined 
following Rajan-Zingales (1998). The 5-year lagged values of bank concentration as instruments for 
bank concentration (Conc). C, I, and Y are province, industry, and year dummies, respectively.  
 
Column 1 2 3 4 
Dependent Ln (No.Est.) Ln (Av. Size) 
Sample LOW HIGH LOW HIGH 
Sh 
4.751*** 10.713*** 2.033*** 4.922*** 
(0.630) (0.741) (0.468) (0.539) 
Conc*Ext 
-0.685 -2.680*** -0.458 0.502* 
(0.524) (0.393) (0.426) (0.262) 
Constant 
6.363*** 0.456* 4.344*** 4.449*** 
(0.417) (0.243) (0.343) (0.212) 
C Yes Yes Yes Yes 
I Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Y Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 1172 962 1172 962 
R-squared 0.811 0.918 0.626 0.782 
Endogeneity test  0.119 0.395 0.593 0.415 
F test first stage 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R² first stage 0.974 0.983 0.974 0.983 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Endogeneity test tests the null hypothesis that the suspected endogenous regressor Conc*Ext can 
actually be treated as exogenous. P-values are reported. First stage F-test of exclude instrument. P-
value are reported. 
First stage R² reported. 
Note that because of data availability for the series of the 5-year lagged values of bank concentration 
we lose observations. 
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Table I.8 IRLS estimation results (columns 1-4) and OLS estimation results for restricted sample to 
the within 5th and 95th percentile of the bank concentration distributions (columns 5-8) in two sub-
samples of low income (LOW) and high income (HIGH) countries. In columns 1-2 and 5-6 the 
dependent variable is the (natural log of the) number of establishments in industry i, country c at year 
t. In columns 3-4 and 7-8 the dependent variable is the (natural log of the) average establishment size 
in industry i, country c at year t. Sh is the share of sector value added over the total manufacturing in 
industry i, country c at time t. Conc is an index of bank concentration (the share of the three largest 
banks on the total assets of all commercial banks) in country c at year t. Ext is an indicator of external 
finance dependence for each industry i, defined following Rajan-Zingales (1998). C, I, and Y are 
province, industry, and year dummies, respectively.  
 
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Estimation IRLS OLS 
Dependent Ln (No.Est.) Ln (Av. Size) Ln (No.Est.) Ln (Av. Size) 
Sample LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH 
Sh 
5.188*** 9.953*** 4.127*** 5.719*** 5.672*** 10.634*** 2.809*** 5.556*** 
(0.271) (0.472) (0.226) (0.338) (0.604) (0.622) (0.479) (0.402) 
Conc*Ext 
-0.144 -2.256*** -0.521*** 0.427** -0.317 -2.737*** -0.195 0.633*** 
(0.216) (0.246) (0.180) (0.176) (0.320) (0.307) (0.261) (0.232) 
Constant 
2.677*** -0.149 4.296*** 6.703*** 1.705*** 7.440*** 4.465*** 4.033*** 
(0.183) (0.172) (0.153) (0.124) (0.265) (0.294) (0.253) (0.201) 
C Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
I Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Y Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 2673 1696 2673 1696 2497 1560 2497 1560 
R-squared 0.869 0.927 0.714 0.854 0.816 0.905 0.645 0.782 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table I.9 OLS estimation results for augmented models for the full sample of 42 countries (FULL) 
and the two sub-samples of low income (LOW) and high income (HIGH) countries. In columns 1-3 the 
dependent variables is the (natural log of the) number of establishments in industry i, country c at 
year t. In columns 4-6 the dependent variable is the (natural log of the) average establishment size in 
industry i, country c at year t. Sh is the share of sector value added over the total manufacturing in 
industry i, country c at time t. Conc is an index of bank concentration (the share of the three largest 
banks on the total assets of all commercial banks) in country c at year t. Cr is private credit to GDP in 
country c at year t. Ext is an indicator of external finance dependence for each industry i, defined 
following Rajan-Zingales (1998). C, I, and Y are province, industry, and year dummies, respectively. 
 
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent Ln (No. Est.) Ln (Av. Size) 
Sample FULL LOW HIGH FULL LOW HIGH 
Sh 
6.783*** 5.390*** 9.547*** 2.720*** 2.679*** 4.949*** 
(0.550) (0.541) (0.786) (0.334) (0.419) (0.457) 
Conc*Ext 
-0.756*** -0.236 -2.448*** -0.275 -0.317 0.466** 
(0.229) (0.288) (0.295) (0.183) (0.244) (0.222) 
Cr * Ext 
1.278*** 0.065 0.943*** -0.039 0.689*** -0.090 
(0.135) (0.238) (0.165) (0.113) (0.218) (0.138) 
Constant 5.248*** 4.044*** 0.295 3.511*** 4.377*** 6.579*** 
 (0.262) (0.324) (0.197) (0.199) (0.232) (0.144) 
C Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
I Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Y Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 4369 2673 1696 4369 2673 1696 
R-squared 0.850 0.820 0.907 0.706 0.643 0.788 
Wald test 1  0.000  0.017 
Wald test 2  0.002  0.003 
Chow test  0.000  0.000 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Wald 1 test tests the null hypothesis of equality between Conc*Ext coefficients of the two groups of 
countries. P-values are reported. 
Wald 2 test tests the null hypothesis of equality between Cr*Ext coefficients of the two groups of 
countries. P-values are reported. 
Chow test tests the null hypothesis of equality between the coefficients of all the independent 
variables (except country dummies) of the two groups of countries. P-values are reported. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
Table I.10a-I.10b OLS estimation results for models including country-year trends (Table I.10a) 
and country-year and industry-year trends (Table I.10b) for the full sample of 42 countries (FULL) and 
the two sub-samples of low income (LOW) and high income (HIGH) countries. In columns 1-3 the 
dependent variables is the (natural log of the) number of establishments in industry i, country c at 
year t. In columns 4-6 the dependent variable is the (natural log of the) average establishment size in 
industry i, country c at year t. Sh is the share of sector value added over the total manufacturing in 
industry i, country c at time t. Conc is an index of bank concentration (the share of the three largest 
banks on the total assets of all commercial banks) in country c at year t. Ext is an indicator of external 
finance dependence for each industry i, defined following Rajan-Zingales (1998). C, I, and Y are 
province, industry, and year dummies, respectively. 
 
I.10a 
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent Ln (No. Est.) Ln (Av. Size) 
Sample FULL LOW HIGH FULL LOW HIGH 
Sh 
7.209*** 5.475*** 9.708*** 9.747*** 2.766*** 2.784*** 
(0.537) (0.499) (0.807) (0.811) (0.318) (0.401) 
Conc*Ext 
-0.911*** -0.325 -2.618*** -2.795*** -0.212 -0.420* 
(0.237) (0.283) (0.293) (0.307) (0.189) (0.255) 
Constant 
-0.868 1.005 -1.228*** 2.415*** 4.264*** 3.248*** 
(0.893) (0.695) (0.251) (0.297) (0.395) (0.466) 
C*Y Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
I Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 4369 2673 1696 4369 2673 1696 
R-squared 0.849 0.824 0.908 0.713 0.650 0.794 
Wald test   0.000  0.004 
Chow test  0.000  0.000 
 
I.10b 
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent Ln (No. Est.) Ln (Av. Size) 
Sample FULL LOW HIGH FULL LOW HIGH 
Sh 
7.260*** 5.408*** 9.747*** 2.788*** 2.934*** 4.878*** 
(0.541) (0.509) (0.811) (0.307) (0.388) (0.472) 
Conc*Ext 
-0.912*** -0.374 -2.795*** -0.157 -0.369 0.649*** 
(0.249) (0.311) (0.307) (0.195) (0.265) (0.235) 
Constant 
-1.150 2.147 2.415*** 2.495*** 2.687*** 1.304*** 
(1.161) (1.436) (0.297) (0.515) (0.903) (0.275) 
C*Y Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
I*Y Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 4369 2673 1696 4369 2673 1696 
R-squared 0.852 0.834 0.914 0.720 0.669 0.804 
Wald test  0.000  0.004 
Chow test  0.000  0.000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Wald test tests the null hypothesis of equality between Cr*Ext coefficients of the two groups of 
countries. P-values are reported. 
Chow test tests the null hypothesis of equality between the coefficients of all the independent 
variables (except country dummies) of the two groups of countries. P-values are reported. 
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ESSAY II 
BANK CONCENTRATION, CREDIT DEVELOPMENT, 
AND FIRM TURNOVER: EVIDENCE FROM EU 
 
 
II.1 INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
 
Firm entry and exit is at the core of the Schumpeterian process of 
creative destruction, which affects productivity and growth through 
reallocation of resources and innovation. Even if there are differences in 
productivity of new firms across countries and industries, these firms 
can generate a competitive pressures on incumbent firms, encouraging 
them to upgrade their technology and boost their performance in order 
to keep their market shares, or lest to quit the market. Thus, creative 
destruction is likely to enhance productivity and growth.32 
European Union (EU) economies show large differences in firm birth 
and death rates, both at country and industry levels: New Member 
States (NMS) show much higher rates relatively to EU-15 countries.  
The existence of these cross-country differences (both within and 
outside EU) has motivated a growing body of literature trying to sort 
out the causal mechanisms that explain them. The literature shows that 
among the determinants of barriers to firm turnover, besides 
technological and market factors, there are legal, regulatory, 
institutional, and financial factors that might prevent the creation of 
new business activities or expansion of existing businesses, thus acting 
as barriers to entry and growth.33 
                                                          
32 For the original formulation of the argument, see Schumpeter (1942). For a 
theoretical model, see for example, Aghion and Howitt (1992). For empirical 
evidence, see among others, Foster et al. (2001) and Bartelsman et al (2004). 
33 The creation and availability of harmonized databases providing cross-
country indicators on the ease of opening and closing a business, (e.g. the 
World Bank’s Doing Business) and the availability of more detailed and 
harmonized industry and firm level databases (e.g. Bureau Van Dijk’s 
Amadeus database for European firms), have also spurred interest in 
understanding and analyzing barriers to business. See, among others, Djankov 
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This essay focuses on credit constraints as a determinant of firm 
turnover. 
While it is widely accepted that financial system development 
positively affects the real economy at aggregate, industrial and firm 
levels,34 there still are contrasting theoretical and empirical findings 
about the real effects of bank concentration. 
The conventional wisdom is that bank market power leads to higher 
profits for banks, higher interest rates, and a reduction of credit 
supply.35 Sound and profitable projects may not find financing because 
of low credit availability. A non-competitive situation is likely to result 
in a loss of welfare and at the same time may prevent potentially good 
projects from accessing credit, thus reducing the rate at which the 
economy as a whole can grow (Pagano, 1993). 
On the other hand some theoretical and empirical literatures predict 
that the net effect of a concentrated banking market may not be 
negative for real economy performance. This argument focuses on the 
                                                                                                                               
et al. (2002), showing that the administrative and legal costs linked to strong 
business regulations are a barrier to firm entry; Klapper et al. (2006), finding 
that entry regulation is negatively correlated with firm entry; Scarpetta et al. 
(2002), showing that product and labor market regulations are negatively 
associated with firm entry; Fisman and Serria Allende (2004), showing that 
higher entry regulations are beneficial for the expansion of incumbent firms 
rather than the entry of new firms; Aghion et al. (2007), showing that access to 
finance matters most for the entry of small firms and in sectors that are more 
dependent upon external finance. Beck et al. (2008) find that financial 
development disproportionally accelerate growth of those industries that for 
technological reasons are composed of a large share of small firms; thus, 
finance removes obstacles to growth  to small-firms industries. 
34 See, among others, King and Levine (1993a, 1993b), Levine and Zervos (1998), 
La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1998), Levine et al. (2000), and Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000). 
See, Levine (2005), Eschenbach (2004), Papaioannou (2007) for extensive 
reviews of the literature, focusing on different estimation approaches and levels 
of aggregation of data. 
35 See, for example, Hannan (1991) for an analysis of the banking sector 
structure based on the standard structure-conduct-performance paradigm. 
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asymmetric information problem that characterizes the lending 
relationship. Market power allows banks to overcome this problem, 
since a bigger bank has more resources to devote to screening, and 
because lending relationships are usually more stable and longer under 
these circumstances. A bank in a concentrated market has the 
advantage of acquiring crucial information from this enhanced 
relationship with the borrower (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Cetorelli, 
1997) 
Both theoretical propositions about the real effect of bank concentration 
are supported by empirical evidence in economic literature. 
There is also some historical economic evidence about the beneficial 
effects of concentrated banking market during the early stage of 
economic development.36 
Another argument is advanced by bankers who oppose the notion of a 
negative effect of bank market power. The idea is that bigger bank with 
market power bring efficiency gains through the exploitation of 
economies of scale, economies of scope, and managerial efficiency that 
may arise from bank consolidation processes. However, an increase in 
bank concentration, for instance due to bank consolidation through 
mergers and acquisitions, is likely to bring efficiency gains mainly via 
managerial X-efficiency, rather than from economies of scale and 
scope.37 
                                                          
36 Some examples of this relationship are found for France and Germany 
(Gerschenkron, 1965), Italy (Cohen, 1967), United States (Sylla, 1969), and Japan 
(Mayer, 1990). 
37 There is microeconomic evidence that scale economies can usually be 
exploited only by medium-small size banks. It should also be noted that 
managerial X-efficiency gains are more likely to be associated with cross-
market mergers and acquisitions, and this seems to be the case of NMS. 
However, the effect of entry of foreign bank is influenced by the mode of entry, 
because it affects the level of bank concentration and competition as well as 
because it influences the transfer of managerial efficiency and the acquiring of 
local information. For a review on bank consolidation consequences, see Berger 
et al. (1999). 
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Firm entry and exit are influenced by the banking sector through the 
firms’ need of external finance. If the market structure and the size of 
the banking sector, and/or the combination of both are not efficient in 
allocating funds to the private sector, firms will face a barrier to access 
to credit. Younger or new entrant firms would be especially credit-
constrained because they usually have a limited or no credit history at 
all (thus providing difficulties for banks assessing and screening the 
potential soundness of their project) or because banks prefer to limit 
real sector competition in order to preserve the market shares of the 
incumbent firms with which they have already established lending 
relationships. If incumbent firms do not have to face higher 
competition, they are less likely to improve their production processes 
in order to keep their market shares and, thus,  are less likely to quit the 
market (Cetrolli and Strahan, 2006). 
Therefore, the hypothesis that firm entry and exit are a function of 
banking structure and banking system size deserves careful scrutiny. 
We hypothesize that the real effect of bank concentration is a function 
of the depth of banking sector (proxied by banks’ private credit on 
GDP), and we estimate the conditional effect of bank concentration of 
the depth of banking sector. 
There are reasons to believe that the effect on the real economy of both 
market structure and size of banking system are not independent from 
each other. In fact, we should take into account the institutional 
determinants of private credit development (i.e. the determinants of the 
decisions of financial intermediaries to extend their credit to the private 
sector). 
The economic literature offers evidence on this point. For example, 
some studies suggest that what matters is the protection of creditors 
rights: countries with better creditor protection and quality of law 
enforcement have more developed financial systems (e.g. La Porta et 
al., 1997). Others argue that information sharing is the crucial element: 
countries with better information sharing institutions and technology 
have more advanced credit markets (e.g. Jappelli and Pagano, 1993, 
2002). However, Djankov et al. (2007), using a large cross-country 
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dataset comprising 129 countries, show that both factors are important 
determinants of private credit development.  
Some studies (e.g. Guiso et al., 2004b) show that barriers to entry and 
competition in banking market are negatively correlated with banking 
sector development. Other studies (e.g. La Porta at al., 2002) show that 
size of government owned banks is negatively correlated with financial 
development. Still, in assessing the good practice of bank supervision 
and regulation, Barth et al. (2004) suggest that fewer regulatory 
restrictions on bank activities, fewer limits on foreign bank entry, 
policies that promote private monitoring of banks, and a smaller share 
of government-owned banks are associated with better banking market 
performance and stability. 
These institutional factors are likely to interact with the structure of the 
banking market. As suggested by theoretical and empirical literature, 
bank market power has an a priori undetermined effect on the real 
economy. However, as argued by Petersen and Rajan (1995), bank 
concentration may be beneficial in overcoming asymmetric information 
in the lending relationship, which may be more severe in economies 
characterized by underdeveloped legal, institutional and regulatory 
systems. 
Thus, by analyzing the real effect of bank concentration conditional on 
the depth of private credit, we can make conjectures about the real 
effect of bank concentration conditional on different levels of 
institutional development and banking market regulation. 
To summarize, theoretical and empirical studies suggest the 
plausibility of the hypothesis that firm entry and exit decisions are 
influenced by the structure and the size of banking system as well as by 
their interaction effect. We contribute to the strand of the literature that 
analyzes the effect of bank concentration on firm demography (Black 
and Strahan, 2002; Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia, 2004; Cetorelli 
and Strahan, 2006) and we analyze whether bank concentration has an 
effect on the firm turnover conditional on the level of banking private 
credit development. 
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Using cross-country cross-industry data for firm birth and death rates 
for 15 of the EU-27 countries and 29 industries averaged over the 
period 2001-2005, and applying the Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
methodology, we find that the effect of bank concentration is 
conditional on the size of banking market and, in particular, that this 
effect is negative for higher level of private credit. This result holds 
after controlling for industry specialization, country and industry fixed 
effects, potential endogeneity and outliers problems, and different 
measures of bank concentration. 
Even if this analysis highlights casual effects of the bank concentration-
private credit development interaction on firm demography, we do not 
explicitly identify the channels. We can only make conjectures about 
the possible channels relying on the theoretical and empirical findings 
with regards to the real effect of bank concentration and credit market 
development. However, we take into consideration some institutional 
and regulatory determinants of banking development as instrumental 
variable when using a 2SLS estimation approach. 
The EU represents an ideal environment for exploring these issues, 
since can exploit larger differences in term of size of banking sector.38 
(Guiso, Jappelli, Padula, and Pagano, 2004). As pointed out by Fries 
and Taci (2002), analyzing a sample of NMS during 1994-1999, these 
countries did not put sufficient effort to promote banking sector 
reforms that affect the development of banking sector.  
The process of financial integration is likely to influence both bank 
concentration and banking private credit to GDP. The interaction term 
between the two variables can give us an insight into the effect of bank 
concentration for different, and most likely increasing, levels of private 
credit to GDP. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next Section 
(II.2), we describe the dataset and define our variables. In Section II.3, 
we present the adopted identification strategy and estimation 
methodology. In Section II.4, we describe our model specification. In 
                                                          
38 See, for example, Guiso, Jappelli, Padula, and Pagano (2004) and Masten et al. 
(2008) for the analysis of the growth effects of EU financial markets integration. 
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Section II.5, we discuss our main results, and in the following Section 
(II.6) we present some robustness checks. Section II.7 concludes. 
 
II.2 DATA 
We use the Business Demography dataset from Eurostat Structural 
Business Statistics, a comprehensive and harmonized database 
containing measures of firm demography for a sample of EU-15 and 
NMS countries. In particular, we use measures of firm birth and death 
rates. 
Firm birth rate (death rate) is defined as the number of newly 
registered (closed) firms over the total number of active firms (with at 
least one person employed) present in a given year in each industry for 
each country.39  
The original data are disaggregated at the industry level following the 
Nace 1.1 classification. The disaggregation at the 2-digit code present 
some imperfections: some manufacturing 2-digit code industries are 
aggregated between them - manufacture of food, beverage and tobacco 
(DA: 15 and 16); manufacture of textiles and textile products (DB: 17 
and 18); manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products; publishing 
and printing (DE: 21 and 22); manufacture of basic metals and 
fabricated metal products (DJ: 27 and 28); manufacture of electrical and 
optical equipment (DL: 30, 31, 32, and 33); manufacture of transport 
equipment (DM: 34 and 35). The rest of the industries are perfectly 
disaggregated at the 2-digit code level. 
We apply some cleaning and sample selection criteria, given that the 
database presents a different number of observations along industries 
and years.  
First of all, following existing literature at the cross-industry cross-
country differences in firm demography and growth, we exclude some 
industries for comparability reasons as well, because of the nature of 
                                                          
39 We use data all type of legal status except sole proprietorship. This is because 
during the period of analysis not all countries report data for this type of legal 
status. 
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some industries. We exclude mining and quarrying (CA, CB), since 
many countries may have different natural resources endowments. 
Moreover, we drop electricity, gas, and water supply (E41), collection 
and purification of water (E42), education (M80), health and social 
work (N85), other community, social and personal service activities 
(O90, O91, O92, and O93), since they have strong links with 
government financing. Finally, we exclude, financial intermediation 
activities (J65, J66, and J67), as they are part of our independent 
variables40. 
We are then left with 29 industries. They belong to manufacturing 
(DA(15-16), DB(17-18), DC19, DD20, DE(21-22), DF23, DG24, DH25, 
DI26, DJ(27-28), DK29, DL(30-33), DM(34-35), and DN36), construction 
(F45), wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles 
and personal and household goods (G50, G51, and G52), hotels and 
restaurants (H55), transport, storage, and communication (I60, I61, I62, 
I63, and I64), and real estate, renting and business activities (K70, K71, 
K72, K73, K74). 
The following step is to ensure that all observations refer to the same 
time period. 
The dataset contains data for 21 EU countries for the period 1997-2005, 
however there are no (or very few) data for NMS prior to 2000 and for 
some of them also for the years after 2005. We, therefore, only keep 
observations in the period 2001-2005. Moreover, we retain those 
countries that show data for at least 2 years during the 5 year span. We 
also drop Luxembourg because of the tiny size of its economy and its 
industrial structure, characterized by presence of a big financial 
intermediation industry, resulting in a disproportionately advanced 
financial system. We drop the UK, because we employ a Rajan-Zingales 
(1998) methodology, which requires an indicator of industries’ external 
                                                          
40 Agriculture, hunting, and forestry (A), fishing (B), public administration, 
defense and compulsory social security (L), activities of household (P), and 
extra-territorial organizations and bodies (Q) are not included in the original 
database. However, these latter industries would be dropped, like in other 
related works in the literature, because their performance is influenced by 
country endowments of natural resources or public financing. We include  
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finance dependence for a country characterized by a very high level of 
financial development to be excluded from the sample, and instead is 
treated as a benchmark economy; in this analyses we compute the 
index on data for UK. We are therefore left with 15 countries, 7 EU-15 
countries and 8 NMS countries.41 
The summary statistics in Table II.2 shows that the level of firm 
turnover is higher in NMS countries. The extremely high maximum 
value of firm entry rate (Table II.1) is due to the values of the 
manufacture of coke and petroleum refineries industry (DF) which is 
usually characterized by a low number of active firms and even a small 
number of entry firms result in relatively high entry rates. The 
distribution do not present other relevant cases of extreme outliers. 
However, as a robustness check we estimate our model specification 
(Table I.6) restricting the sample within the 5th and 95th percentile of the 
dependent variables distributions to control for the possible influence 
of outliers.      
Our main indicators of financial system development and structure are 
commonly used in the finance and growth literature. They are 
averaged over the period 2001-2005, and they are defined as follows: 
• Private credit to GDP (Cred): This is defined as private credit by 
deposit money banks to GDP, which is a measure of claim on private 
sectors by deposit money bank. We take the average values along the 
period of analysis. Data come from the updated Financial Structure 
Database (see Beck et al., 2000). We use this variable as a proxy of the 
depth and size of the private credit market, following most of the 
literature on finance and growth. 
• Bank concentration (Conc): We use the C3 ratio from the Financial 
Structure Database of Beck et al. (2000) as our main indicator of bank 
concentration. It is defined as the assets of the three largest banks as a 
share of assets of all commercial banks in each country. However, in 
order to test the robustness of this indicator, we also use other 
measures of bank concentration such as the C5 ratio and the Herfindal-
                                                          
41 Finland, France, Italy, Netherland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
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Hirshman index (HHI ). We compute these last two indicators from the 
Bank Scope database of Bureau Van Dijk, and they are defined as the 
share of the 5 major banks and the sum of the squares of each bank 
share on total assets, respectively. We take the average values along the 
period of analysis. 
These financial structure and credit development outcome variables 
may be endogenous to firms dynamics. We reduce endogeneity 
problems by using the Rajan-Zingales (1998) methodology, interacting 
the financial variables with an industry indicator calculated for a 
country that is not present in the sample (i.e. so that it enters as 
exogenous in our sample). Furthermore, we also follow the 2SLS 
approach of Aghion et al. (2007), instrumenting credit market variables 
(in our case both banking credit development and concentration). 
Banking structure and development might be determined by 
institutional, political, regulatory, and economic factors that may also 
influence firms performance (La Porta et al., 1997). There may be 
reverse causality problems where the structure and performance of the 
real sector affect the financial sector and force it to adjust as a 
consequence of their performance (Cetorelli and Gambera, 2001). The 
relationship between bank concentration and industrial sectors could 
also manifest problmes as the big industrial groups might control 
activities in both non-financial and financial sectors. 42 
We chose our instruments following the literature on the determinants 
of structure and development of banking markets.43  Our instruments 
are defined as follows: 
                                                          
42 See Cetorelli (2004) for an empirical contribution on this specific point. 
43 Aghion et al. (2007) use similar variables to instrument the private credit to 
GDP. These instruments have been selected from a wider set on basis of their 
performance during the first stage estimations. The instruments that were not 
choosen on the basis of their performance in the first stage of the 2SLS 
estimations are an index of credit rights protection (La Porta et al., 1997) and an 
index of information sharing (Jappelli and Pagano, 1993, 2002). Their statistical 
significance was not stable in the various models and at the introduction of 
other instruments. 
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 • Regulation of bank activities (Restr): This measures the degree of 
restrictiveness on bank activities and ownership on non-financial 
firms44. It comes from Barth et al. (2001) original dataset (data are for 
1999). As summarized by Barth et al. (2004), there are theoretical 
arguments to support both the positive and negative role of regulatory 
restriction on bank activities on banking development. On the first 
argument, banks’ activities might be restricted as there might arise 
conflicts of interest between banks and their activities on other sectors; 
larger banking and financial groups may become too large to monitor 
and regulate, and they may gain too much market power, thus 
reducing competition. On the other hand, others support that lower 
regulatory restrictions allows banks to better exploit scale and scope 
economies, and diversify risk through different sources of income. 
Regulatory restrictions may also lead to government power as it may 
set up conditions to corruption to violate the regulations. Supporting 
this last view, Barth el al. (2004), consistently with other empirical 
works, shows that higher banks activities regulations are associated 
with lower banking development and stability.  
• A composite index that measures the competition from foreign banks 
(ForComp): This is defined as a combination of the denial rate of 
foreign banks’ applications for licenses and the size of the entrant 
foreign banks. This indicator comes from the Economic Freedom of the 
World (EFW) 2000 database. Barriers to entry faced by foreign banks 
may influence both the competition of domestic banking market and 
their development. Some scholars argue that the degree of 
contestability and the presence of foreign banks may spur competition 
among banks and lead to better banking performance (i.e. Classens et 
al., 2001; Guiso et al., 2004b).  
• Ownership of the banks-percentage of deposits held in privately 
owned banks (BankOwn). This indicator comes from EFW 2000 
database. Some studies concerning the role of government-owned 
banks on the development of banking sector have shown a negative 
                                                          
44 Some authors have used this indicator as an instrument for banking sector 
structure and development; see for example, Aghion et al. (2007) and Beck et al. 
(2004). 
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effects both on banking development and economic growth (i.e. La 
Porta et al, 2002; Barth et al., 2004).45 
We also use as additional instruments the value of bank concentration 
and private credit for the year 1996, that is 5-year lagged values respect 
to the initial year of this analysis (2001). 
 
II.3 METHODOLOGY 
Earlier contributions in finance and growth literature are usually 
affected by problems of endogeneity and identification of casual 
relationship between financial system development and economic 
growth. Since the seminal work of Rajan and Zingales (1998), a 
growing number of works have applied this methodology, which 
overcome these problems. 
The idea is that the financial system impacts the real economy through 
the firms’ need of external finance. Incumbent firms wanting to expand 
their business or firms that want to enter the market may need external 
financial resources and, thus, differentially benefit from financial 
development. In other words, firms that usually need more external 
finance would benefit relatively more than firms that rely less on 
external finance when there is more credit availability and/or an easier 
access to finance. 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) assumes that firms within a given industry 
do not differ much in terms of external finance dependence. The need 
of external finance is mainly due to technological reasons, so there is 
more difference between industries than within them. Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) develop an industry specific indicator of external 
finance dependence using firm level data which is defined as the 
industry-level median of the ratio of capital expenditures minus cash 
flows over capital expenditures. This variable measures the portion of 
capital expenditures not financed by internally generated cash. One of 
the main sources of criticism raised against this methodology is the fact 
                                                          
45 See, for example, Bonin et al. (2005) and the literature therein for state-
ownership in Eastern Europe. 
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that the original indicator is calculated for US firms, since firms across 
countries are unlikely to have the same characteristics as firms in the 
US. However, as first argued by Rajan and Zingales (1998), we should 
not assume that an industry uses exactly the same technology in 
different countries, but that the same industry uses the same level of 
technology (and hence has the same need of external finance) relative 
to the other industries in each country. 
By estimating an interaction term between the country financial 
variable of interest and this indicator of external finance, we estimate 
the differential effect across industries. If firms between industries 
differ in their needs of external finance, the effects of changes in 
banking markets performance should be more likely to be picked for 
firms in industry that have more intensive relationship with the 
banking market.  
The fact that the industry-specific indicator of external finance is 
calculated for the quoted firms of a benchmark economy (which is 
assumed to be the most advanced financial market and economy) is an 
advantage because it does not reflect differences between supply and 
demand of external finance, so it reflects the need of external finance 
due to technological reasons to the possible extend. Computing the 
indicator for countries that do not have well-developed financial 
systems would produce a measurement more influenced by supply and 
demand differences of external finance. 
Another advantage of the Rajan and Zingales (1998) methodology is 
that it helps to reduce possible endogeneity problems. The indicator of 
external finance enters as exogenous in our sample, since it is 
calculated for firms that are not part of the sample. By interacting this 
with our country financial variables of interest, we reduce possible 
source of endogeneity. 
In this essay, we computed the external finance indicator using the UK 
as the benchmark economy. The UK is assumed to be the most 
advanced European financial system, and their quoted firms face fewer 
constraints to access to finance. Computing the external finance 
indicator for UK quoted firms reduces the probability of accounting for 
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the differences in demand and supply of credit that characterize the 
financial markets. 
We compute this indicator for UK firms because the particular industry 
aggregation of our data does not allow us to use the original Rajan and 
Zingales (1998)  indicator computed for US firms (as most of the works 
related to this topic do). As such, we need to compute our own 
indicator following our particular industry aggregation.  
We use the Bureau Van Dijk’s FAME database, which is a 
comprehensive collection of UK firms characteristics and balance sheets 
items.  
We use only the UK quoted firms present in the 2008 version of the 
database to compute our indicator of external finance.46 
Building upon the original Rajan and Zingales (1998)  indicator, we 
define our indicator as the ratio between capital expenditure minus net 
cash flow from operating activities over capital expenditure.47 For any 
firm the numerator and denominator are summed over all years before 
dividing, and for any industry, we take the median firm (instead of the 
mean), in order to limit the influence of outliers.48 
                                                          
46 The bottom limit (1997) is due to data availability in the used version of 
FAME, while the upper limit (2004) correspond to the last year of the other 
variables used in this analysis. In total, we use 5745 observations during the 
period 1997-2004. 
47 There are some contributions in the literature that compute an indicator of 
external finance dependence using UK firms data from Bureau Van Dijk (i.e. 
from Amadeus dataset, which is the international version of the FAME 
database). Some of them compute a quite different indexes (Giannetti and 
Ongena, 2007; Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2007), while others try to 
computed the original Rajan and Zingales (1998) indicator (Jõeveer and Tóth, 
2006). We check our estimation results for different strategies in the 
computation of the index, as the inclusion of all UK firms rather than only 
quoted firms present in our version of FAME database. The results do not 
change. 
48 Clearly, there are differences about the  number of available observations 
(years) between firms, and the number of quoted firms present in each 
industry. 
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Following Rajan and Zingales (1998) a variable indicating the relative 
importance of each industry on the country total industrial sectors  
(taken at the beginning of the period of analysis) is included in the 
model. This is to avoid possible reverse causality problems and take 
into account the different industrial specialization that may drive 
differences in growth potential across countries.  
Furthermore, country and industry fixed effects are also included. 
There is no doubt that factors other than financial development 
influence industry performance and the inclusion of country and 
industry fixed effects prevents model misspecification and omitted 
variable problems. However, our country level financial variables of 
interest are still identified since they are interacted with an industry 
specific variable (external finance dependence) the channel through 
which financial system variables are assumed to have an impact on 
industry performance. 
Finally, we believe that given the cross-industry cross-country 
dimension of our data and the “finance and growth” nature of our 
question, the Rajan and Zingales (1998)  methodology fits well with this 
analysis. 
 
II.4 MODEL SPECIFICATION 
Returning to our research question, we want to identify the effect of 
bank concentration conditional on different levels of private credit 
development on firm demography, using industry data for 15 EU 
countries averaged for the period 2001-2005. Our benchmark model 
looks as follows: 
 
FirmDemc,i=β0+β1(Shc,i)+β2(Concc*Exti)+β3(Crc*Exti) 
+β4(Concc*Crc*Exti)+θ1Cc+θ2Ii+εc,i 
 
where FirmDem is firm birth rate and death rate in any industry i in 
country c. Sh is the share in terms of number of firms of each industry i 
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over the total number of industries included in our sample in country c. 
Ext is the Rajan and Zingales (1998)  industry specific indicator of 
external finance dependence. Conc and BankCr are the index of bank 
concentration and banking private credit on GDP in any country c, as 
described in Section II.2. C and I are country and industry fixed effects, 
respectively. 
According to our hypothesis we would like to test whether the 
coefficient of the interaction term between bank concentration and 
private credit (BankCr*Conc*Ext) is significant. Depending on the sign 
and significance of all the three coefficients (β2, β3, and β4), we will 
accept or reject the hypothesis that the effect of bank concentration on 
firm demography is conditional on the level of private credit 
development, and gauge the direction of the effect. 
 
FirmDemc,i=β0+β1(Shc,i)+β2(Concc*Exti)+β3(Crc*Exti)+θ1Cc+θ2Ii+εc,i 
 
The combination of the estimation results of both model specifications 
allows us to understand whether the effect of bank concentration is 
conditional on the level of private credit, or if it is linear. 
 
II.5 ESTIMATION RESULTS 
All the estimated specifications have been estimated using both OLS 
and 2SLS to control for potential endogeneity of bank concentration 
and private credit to GDP, and their interaction term. The endogeinity 
test (reported in any specification) of the two or three potentially 
endogeneous variable test the null hypothesis that hat the suspected 
endogenous regressors can actually be treated as exogenous.49 When 
the null hypothesis is not rejected we report OLS estimation, otherwise 
2SLS. 
To test the validity of the chosen instruments we report first stages’ F-
test of excluded instruments and R², and the Hansen’s J static, that is 
                                                          
49 The used test is a robust version of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. 
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the robust version of the Sargan-Hansen test for overidentifying 
restrictions. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid 
instruments, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded 
from the estimated equation.50  
Table II.5 (columns 1, 3, 5, 7) show estimation results for OLS 
estimation using non-centered variables while we report (columns 2, 4, 
6, 8) estimation results using centered variables to reduce 
multicollinearity problems. For the rest of the estimation we use 
centered variables.51  
In addition to the specification discussed in the previous section, we 
also estimate a reduced specification of our model that does not include 
the interaction term between bank concentration and banking credit 
development, but rather only the two single terms. 
The estimation results  (Table II.5 columns 1-2 and 5-6) for the reduced 
model specification support earlier findings that the higher levels of 
private credit to GDP are beneficial for firm dynamics (i.e., Rajan and 
Zingales (1998); Perotti and Volpin, 2005; Bonaccorsi di Patti and 
Dell’Ariccia, 2004; Aghion et al., 2007). Replication of earlier findings 
adds confidence in the validity of our contributions. We also find that 
bank concentration is not significantly correlated or negatively 
correlated with firm entry and exit. The fact that we do not find a 
statistically significant relationship between bank concentration and 
entry and exit may rise some doubts about the linearity of the 
                                                          
50 The test is distributed as a Chi-squared in the number of indentifying 
restrictions. 
51 Multicollinearity might affect the estimation in a model including an 
interaction term between two variables which are included in the model as 
single terms. However, the presence of multicollinearty (even extreme) does 
not affect the effectiveness of the OLS estimator as long as there is not perfect 
multicollinearity, but it might affect the standard errors. The variance inflation 
factor test indicates that the model with non-centered variables is affected by 
multicollinearity, while the model with centered variable is not. We therefore 
decide to proceed with the model inclusing centered variables.  
 
52 
 
relationship. We thus add to the model the interaction term between 
bank concentration and private credit to GDP.  
Table II.5 (columns 3-4 and 7-8) show estimations results for the 
augmented model including the interaction term between bank 
concentration and private credit to GDP. The coefficient of credit to 
GDP remain statistically significant and positively associated with both 
the measures of firm turnover, indicating that the depth of banking 
market spurs firm turnover. We find that the interaction term between 
bank concentration and private credit to GDP is statistically significant, 
while the single term of bank concentration is not significant in the 
entry model and positive in the exit model. This confirm our suspect 
about the hypothesis that the effect of bank concentration on measures 
of firm turnover is conditional on the level of banking market 
development. 
In order to convey, a clear idea of the economic significance of our 
estimated coefficients in a Rajan and Zingales (1998) framework, we 
illustrate simple simulation exercises. We begin with the model 
specifications not including the interaction between bank concentration 
and private credit and, in particular, we take the estimation results on 
birth rate (Table II.5 column 2) as example. Let’s look at the coefficient 
of Cr*Ext. The coefficient is significant and positive, indicating a 
beneficial effect of private credit development on firms’ death rate for 
higher levels of external finance dependence. For example, a positive 
coefficient of Cr*Ext means that a switch from the country at 25th 
percentile of the private credit development distribution to the country 
at the 75th percentile of the same distribution, would have a greater 
impact on the industry that has an external finance dependence at the 
75th percentile of the external finance dependence distribution 
compared to an industry at the 25th percentile of the same distribution. 
Given a coefficient of 0.394, the differential effect would be 0.33 on 
firms’ birth rate52. Given that the mean of birth rate is around 8.50, 
                                                          
52 Mathematically, it means: Coeff *(Cr75-Cr25)*(Ext75-Ext25), where Coeff is 
the estimated coefficient, Ext75 and Ext25 are the values of the external finance 
dependence variable at the 75th and 25th percentile of its distribution, 
respectively, while Cr75 and Cr25 are the values of the bank concentration 
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these change would improve the entry rates of around 10.3%. A similar 
exercise can be conducted for the any given industry: given a value of 
external finance dependence (i.e. given an industry), a positive 
coefficient means that, everything else equal, firm turnover is higher in 
those countries with more developed private credit. 
Let’s now consider the economic significance of the estimated 
coefficient in the model specifications that include the interaction term 
between bank concentration and private credit development and taking 
the estimation results on firm birth rate as example (Table II.5 column 
4). The estimated coefficients of Conc*Ext is not statistically significant 
wile Cr*Ext is significant and positive. 
In order to interpret these coefficients the same reasoning than above is 
applied. However, we should take into account also the condition 
effects that comes from the significant interaction coefficient 
(Cr*Conc*Ext) which has a negative sign. This tells us that for higher 
level of private credit development an increase of bank concentration 
would have a decreasing effect on the measure of firm entry in more 
external finance-dependent than in less dependent industries.53  
Thus, when the coefficient of the interaction term (Cr*Conc*Ext) is 
significant, differential the effect of banking development and 
concentration on the dependent variables is now d(Birth rate)/d(Conc)= 
β2+β4*(Cr). 
The result is as follows: d(Birth rate)/d(Conc) = 0 – 1.911*(Cr). This is 
equal to zero when Cr is equal to 0=0/1.911. Recall that these estimates 
comes from a model that used centered variables: Cr is centerd around 
0.41 ratio of private credit to GDP.54 Any level of private credit to GDP 
                                                                                                                               
variable at the 75th and 25th percentile of its country-year distribution, 
respectively. 
53 Or, in the other way round, it tells us that for higher level of bank 
concentration an increase of private credit to GDP have a decreasing effect on 
firm entry. 
54 We center the independent variables around their median values to better 
interpret our result as the median values of Cr correspond, in our sample, to 
the highest value of Cr for CEEC (i.e. Slovenia). All the values of Cr below the 
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above 41% will make negative the effect of an increase in bank 
concentration on firm entry.55 In the analyzed sample all CEEC are 
below this threshold value and, consequently, all the EU-15 countries 
are above. 
We repeat the same exercise for the effect of bank concentration on firm 
death rate conditional to private credit to GDP. On the basis of the 
estimated coefficient in Table II.5 (column 8), we find that the value is 
90% of the ratio of private credit to GDP above which a higher level of 
bank concentration has a negative effect on firm death rate. In our 
sample most of the EU-15 countries have a level of private credit to 
GDP above this level. 
Interpreting the results in terms of the effects of bank concentration on 
firm turnover conditional on the size of banking market, we find that 
bank concentration reduces firm turnover only for extreme values of 
private credit to GDP. This support the hypothesis that when the size of 
credit market is sufficiently large (and this is likely in countries with 
better institutional and regulatory framework that help to the 
smoothing of the asymmetric information and incentive bank 
competition), bank market power reduces the quantity of funds to 
entrants and prefer to lend to incumbent firms. This would result in 
lower firm birth and death rates. 
For lower levels of private credit to GDP, the effects of bank 
concentration on firm dynamics is ambiguous, since it is not significant 
on the entry of firms but it is positive on the exit of firms. The firm 
turnover increases but bank concentration does not seem to stimulate 
                                                                                                                               
median belong to CEEC, while above to EU-15 countries. This allows us to 
easier interpret the effects distinguishing between CEEC and EU-15 countries. 
55 Since we have estimated the differential effects by interacting the financial 
variables (Conc, Cr, and Con*Cr) with an industry indicator of external finance 
(Ext), the right interpretation of the turning point should be in term of 
differential effect: any level of private credit by deposit money bank on GDP 
above 41% will make negative the effect of an increase in bank concentration on 
firm demography for those industry more dependent on external finance 
respect to less dependent industries. 
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the replace exits with new firms, resulting in a clear negative effect net 
entry rate. 
The analysis of the dataset used in this essay does not allow us to make 
conjectures on the positive role of bank concentration on firm dynamics 
for lower levels of private credit to GDP, since we cannot assess 
whether the firms that exit the market are unproductive ones. One may 
argue that the same holds when commenting the results for higher 
levels of private credit to GDP, however in that case we observe both 
lower entry and exit, so we are more confident to interpret the results 
in terms of negative effect of bank concentration on firm dynamics. 
Interpreting the results in terms of the effects on firm turnover of 
private credit to GDP conditional on bank concentration, we find that 
private credit to GDP reduce firm turnover only for extreme values of 
bank concentration. This support the view that an improvement in the 
quantity of credit available in the economy is beneficial, except when 
the bank concentration is extremely high to make inefficient the 
allocation of credit.    
Today, most of the NMS analyzed in this essay have higher levels of 
private credit to GDP, this implies that in an higher number of 
countries the increase in bank concentration may reduce firm birth and 
death rates.  
 
II.6 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
II.6.1 Outliers 
In order to make sure that our results are not driven by outliers, we 
check whether the adoption of more restrictive data cleaning criteria 
has important effects on estimation results. 
In Table II.6 (columns 1-2), we show the results for a more restrictive 
sample that includes firm birth and death rates ranging from the 5th to 
the 95th percentile of their original distributions. The estimation results 
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confirm our previous findings in terms of significance, sign, and 
magnitude of the coefficients.56 
Then, we try to drop bank concentration and private credit 
development outlying countries. 
Netherlands and Romania are the countries with highest and lowest 
average banking credit development (Table II.6 columns 3-4), while 
Finland and Italy are the countries with the highest and lowest bank 
concentration ratios (Table II.6 columns 5-6). Our main results are 
confirmed.  
 
II.6.2 Alternative measures of bank concentration 
We also check whether our results holds for other measures of bank 
concentration. We use the C5 ratio and the HHI index of concentration. 
As shown in Table II.7 the main results are confirmed. 
This means that even after controlling for different measures of bank 
concentration and giving less weight to top three banks, a more 
concentrated structure of banking market is detrimental for firm entry, 
exit and turnover only for higher level of private credit development.  
 
II.7 CONCLUSION 
This essay analyzed the effect of bank concentration on firm turnover 
conditional on the size of banking credit markets. Using cross-country 
cross-industry data for a sample of EU countries (both NMS and EU-15) 
and applying the Rajan and Zingales (1998) methodology, we have 
found that higher level of private credit to GDP are positively 
associated with both firm entry and exit, while bank concentration has 
a negative effect on measures of firm turnover when the size of the 
credit market is sufficiently developed.  
                                                          
56 Now we also find a significant relationship of bank concentration on birth 
rates.  
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We find evidence of a threshold value of private credit by banks to 
GDP that determines the turning point above which the real effect of 
bank concentration becomes negative on firm entry. In our sample this 
value is around 40%, which, in our sample during the period of 
analysis, perfectly divides EU-15 countries from NMS ones: a higher 
level of bank concentration is associated with lower firm entry only in 
EU-15, while in NMS higher bank concentration is not significantly 
associated with firm entry.  
The analysis of firm exit shows that there is also a threshold value of 
private credit to GDP above which bank concentration reduce firm exit 
(this value seems to be higher than the threshold value on entry). 
Thus, our findings confirm that in countries with more developed 
financial and legal institution, bank market power represents a barrier 
to entry for the new firm in the market and in general is associated with 
more limited firm dynamics: more competitive financial institutions 
generate in these markets a positive competition for funding and 
enlarge the total amount of credit for financing new and innovative 
firms (which are typically the more constrained ones). 
 Since the countries selected by the threshold are those belonging to EU 
15, we can interpret this evidence as suggesting that these markets 
benefit from common rules and homogeneous institutions. In these 
countries, which are more financially integrated (as they have belonged 
to the EU at least since 1996), common institutions are beginning to 
homogenize markets, increasing transparency and reducing 
information asymmetries: this is the case in which more competition 
may generate an increase of firms turnover. 
By contrast, NMS countries are characterized by more opaque firms, as 
the institutional and regulatory factors are still not well developed. In 
such a situation, credit institutions with market power may better 
evaluate and monitor credit risk and can diversify their risk financing 
also more risky businesses like innovative firms or new entrants. As 
suggested by Petersen and Rajan (1995), bank market power may 
overcome asymmetric information and risk problems as banks can lend 
even to young and unknown entrepreneurs if they have the expectation 
to establish profitable long term lending relationships. In the case of 
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NMS, this effect probably offsets the costs associated with higher bank 
concentration and leads to a not significant relationship between bank 
concentration and firm entry.  
We should be aware that the limitations of our dataset do not allows us 
to distinguish between the size, the age and the productivity of firms. 
Thus we only suggest possible interpretations of our results in the light 
of theories about the real effects of bank concentration and banking 
credit development.  
What is important to stress is that the effect of bank concentration on 
firm turnover seem to be conditional on the depth of credit market and, 
in particular, that bank market power limits firm turnover in more 
financial developed countries.  
Theories and evidence suggest that the development of credit markets 
is associated with better, more transparent, and competition enhancing 
regulation and institutions. Thus, by analyzing the effect of bank 
concentration on firm turnover conditional on the size of banking 
market we are indirectly analyzing the effect of banking market 
conditional on the level of financial regulation and institutions. Not 
surprisingly we find a different real effect of bank concentration for 
EU-15 and NMS. 
However, both the level of financial development and the institutional 
design in NMS is likely to be affected by the ongoing process of 
financial integration.  
In NMS the size of credit market is growing rapidly and today some 
NMS have higher levels of banking credit to GDP than those reflected 
in the data we analyzed.  
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APPENDIX AT ESSAY II: TABLES OF SUMMARY STATISTICS AND 
RESULTS 
 
Table II.1 Summary statistics. Period 2001-2005. Birth rate is the average during the period of the 
ratio between the firm births and active firms in industry i in country c . Death rate is the average 
during the period of the ratio between the firm deaths and active firms in industry i in country c . Sh is 
the share of active firms to the total of active firms in industry i, country c at the beginning of the 
period. 
 
Variable N Mean SE Min Max p1 p5 p50 p95 p99 
Birth rate 435 8.508 0.251 0.000 50.000 1.550 2.646 7.431 16.510 24.838 
Death rate 435 5.720 0.128 0.000 25.000 1.261 3.076 5.145 10.033 15.472 
Sh 435 3.448 0.256 0.001 43.528 0.008 0.029 1.352 15.507 22.142 
 
Table II.2 Mean value by country. Period 2001-2005. Birth rate is firm birth rate in industry i, in 
country c. Death rate is firm death rate in industry i, in country c. Sh is the share of active firms to the 
total active firms in industry i, country c at the beginning of the period. Conc is the average during the 
period of an index of bank concentration (i.e. the share of the three largest banks on the total assets of 
all commercial banks) in country c. Cr is the average during the period of private credit to GDP in 
country c. Restr measures the degree of restrictiveness on bank activities and ownership in country c. 
Own measures percentage f deposits held in privately owned banks in country c. ForComp is a 
composite measure of competition from foreign banks in country c. 
 
Country Birth rate Death rate Conc Cr Restr Own ForComp 
CZ 9.257 6.410 0.613 0.332 0.750 0.500 0.490 
EE 10.249 7.778 0.979 0.299 0.500 1.000 0.660 
ES 7.672 4.408 0.738 1.088 1.000 1.000 0.610 
FI 4.387 5.016 0.984 0.608 0.500 1.000 0.810 
FR 6.914 4.586 0.554 0.869 0.500 1.000 0.670 
HU 10.402 7.888 0.617 0.376 0.750 0.800 0.690 
IT 5.827 4.819 0.481 0.802 0.500 0.500 0.570 
LT 13.405 5.756 0.798 0.169 0.500 0.500 0.520 
LV 10.980 5.304 0.546 0.292 0.500 1.000 0.510 
NL 5.732 6.139 0.601 1.451 1.000 1.000 0.820 
PT 7.252 4.639 0.869 1.370 0.750 0.500 0.730 
RO 16.329 9.020 0.643 0.106 0.750 0.200 0.810 
SE 3.815 3.946 0.951 0.951 1.000 1.000 0.650 
SI 6.322 4.056 0.645 0.413 0.750 0.500 0.480 
SK 9.084 6.037 0.793 0.349 0.750 0.800 0.530 
Total 8.508 5.720 0.721 0.632 0.700 0.753 0.637 
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Table II.3 Summary statistics by industries. Period 2001-2005. Ext is an indicator of external finance 
dependence for each industry i. Birth rate is the average during the period of the ratio between the 
firm births and active firms in industry i in country c . Death rate is the average during the period of 
the ratio between the firm deaths and active firms in industry i in country c . Sh is the share of active 
firms to the total active firms in industry i, country c at the beginning of the period. 
 
Nace 1.1 code Nace description Ext Birth rate Death rate Sh 
DA Manufacture of food products; beverages and tobacco -0.920 5.382 5.753 2.000 
DB Manufacture of textiles and textile products -1.581 6.267 6.523 1.604 
DC Manufacture of leather and leather products -3.561 5.242 6.182 0.326 
DD Manufacture of wood and wood products -0.192 6.830 5.934 1.645 
DE Manufacture of pulp, paper and products; publishing and printing 0.210 7.339 5.304 1.981 
DF Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel -0.710 11.690 8.127 0.011 
DG Manufacture of chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibres -0.160 5.652 4.534 0.339 
DH Manufacture of rubber and plastic products -1.113 6.036 4.339 0.626 
DI Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products -1.278 6.043 4.706 0.684 
DJ Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products -1.373 7.070 4.390 2.367 
DK Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. -1.551 5.566 4.017 1.186 
DL Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment -0.277 5.878 4.071 1.227 
DM Manufacture of transport equipment -1.103 7.199 4.478 0.356 
DN Manufacturing n.e.c. -1.001 7.273 5.366 1.334 
F45 Construction -1.125 10.066 5.775 10.219 
G50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles -0.962 7.514 4.947 4.366 
G51 Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor -1.583 9.413 7.026 16.363 
G52 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles, motorcycles; repair -0.518 7.990 6.624 17.448 
H55 Hotels and restaurants 0.399 9.460 6.359 5.972 
I60 Land transport; transport via pipelines -0.902 8.268 5.191 3.517 
I61 Water transport 0.109 9.176 7.193 0.128 
I62 Air transport -3.495 9.958 7.707 0.037 
I63 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; travel agencies -0.587 8.953 5.623 1.772 
I64 Post and telecommunications 0.475 14.163 6.705 0.329 
K70 Real estate activities 0.259 11.757 5.781 6.364 
K71 Renting of machinery and equipment -0.544 11.736 6.486 0.799 
K72 Computer and related activities 1.313 12.815 5.971 2.629 
K73 Research and development 7.060 10.571 5.302 0.317 
K74_ Other business activities 0.953 11.441 5.468 14.056 
TOTAL  -0.474 8.508 5.720 3.448 
 
Table II.4 Correlation Matrix. Conc is the average during the period of an index of bank 
concentration (i.e. the share of the three largest banks on the total assets of all commercial banks) in 
country c. Cr is the average during the period of private credit to GDP in country c. Restr measures 
the degree of restrictiveness on bank activities and ownership in country c. Own measures percentage 
f deposits held in privately owned banks in country c. ForComp is a composite measure of 
competition from foreign banks in country c. 
 
 Conc Cr Restr Own Comp 
Conc 1.000     
Cr 0.040 1.000    
Restr 0.062 0.501 1.000   
Own 0.263 0.340 0.087 1.000  
Comp 0.254 0.411 0.193 0.150 1.000 
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Table II.5 2SLS and OLS estimation results. OLS estimation results are reported when the 
endogeneity test does not reject the null hypothesis that suspected endogenous regressors can actually 
be treated as exogenous. In columns 1-4 the dependent variables is firm birth rate in industry i, in 
country c. In columns 5-8 the dependent variable is firm death rate in industry i, in country c. Sh is the 
share of active firms to the total active firms in industry i, country c at the beginning of the period. 
Conc is the average during the period of an index of bank concentration (i.e. the share of the three 
largest banks on the total assets of all commercial banks) in country c. Cr is the average during the 
period of private credit to GDP in country c. Ext is an indicator of external finance dependence for 
each industry i. C and I are the country and industry dummy, respectively. The instruments for Conc, 
Cr, and Conc*Cr are: Restr measures the degree of restrictiveness on bank activities and ownership in 
country c. Own measures percentage f deposits held in privately owned banks in country c. ForComp 
is a composite measure of competition from foreign banks in country c. 
  
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Dependent Birth rate Death rate 
Sh 
-0.198*** -0.198*** -0.197*** -0.197*** 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) 
Conc*Ext 
-0.282 -0.282 0.985 0.195 0.470 0.470 1.666** 0.920** 
(0.363) (0.363) (0.893) (0.503) (0.356) (0.356) (0.761) (0.443) 
Cr*Ext 
0.394** 0.394** 1.771** 0.537***  0.382*** 1.681*** 0.518*** 
(0.173) (0.173) (0.744) (0.168)  (0.122) (0.606) (0.114) 
Conc*Cr*Ext 
  -1.911* -1.911*   -1.803** -1.803** 
  (1.024) (1.024)   (0.845) (0.845) 
Constant 
11.767*** 11.553*** 15.028*** 11.425*** 11.790*** 6.544*** 14.867*** 6.423*** 
(1.269) (1.043) (2.387) (0.971) (1.314) (0.717) (2.256) (0.638) 
Obs. 435 435 435 435 435 435 435 435 
R² 0.623 0.623 0.624 0.624 0.472 0.472 0.477 0.477 
Hansen J 0.267 0.267 0.169 0.169 0.206 0.206 0.743 0.743 
Endogeneity test 0.741 0.741 0.957 0.957 0.901 0.901 0.846 0.846 
FIRST STAGE 
Conc*Ext 
F-test 
p-value 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R² 0.969 0.401 0.969 0.401 0.969 0.401 0.969 0.401 
Cr*Ext 
F-test 
p-value 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R² 0.814 0.766 0.925 0.766 0.925 0.766 0.925 0.766 
Conc*Cr* 
Ext 
F-test 
p-value 
  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 
R²   0.842 0.447   0.842 0.447 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Hansen J test for over-identification restriction; p-values reported. 
Endogeneity test tests the null hypothesis that the suspected endogenous regressors can actually be 
treated as exogenous. P-values are report.  
F-test is the first stage test of excluded instruments; p-values are reported. 
First stage R² is reported. 
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Table II.6 2SLS and OLS estimation results. OLS estimation results are reported when the 
endogeneity test does not reject the null hypothesis that suspected endogenous regressors can actually 
be treated as exogenous. The dependent variable is firm birth rate in industry i, in country c. In 
columns 1-2 the sample is restricted to within the 5th and 95th percentile of the distribution of bank 
concentration. In columns 3-4 the sample is restricted to within the 5th and 95th percentile of the 
distribution of private credit. In columns 5-6 the sample is restricted to within the 5th and 95th 
percentile of the distribution of private credit and to within the 5th and 95th percentile of the 
distribution of bank concentration. In columns 7-8 the sample is restricted to within the 5th and 95th 
percentile of the distribution of firm birth rate. 
Sh is the share of active firms to the total active firms in industry i, country c at the beginning of the 
period. Conc is the average during the period of an index of bank concentration (i.e. the share of the 
three largest banks on the total assets of all commercial banks) in country c. Cr is the average during 
the period of private credit to GDP in country c. Ext is an indicator of external finance dependence for 
each industry i. C and I are the country and industry dummy, respectively. The instruments for Conc, 
Cr, and Conc*Cr are: Restr measures the degree of restrictiveness on bank activities and ownership in 
country c. Own measures percentage f deposits held in privately owned banks in country c. ForComp 
is a composite measure of competition from foreign banks in country c. 
 
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Dependent Birth rate 
Sh 
-0.210*** -0.209*** -0.146*** -0.142*** -0.156*** -0.152*** -0.152*** -0.151*** 
(0.045) (0.045) (0.047) (0.048) (0.053) (0.054) (0.029) (0.028) 
Conc*Ext 
-0.391 0.089 -0.181 0.410 -0.236 0.280 -0.165 0.340 
(0.528) (0.622) (0.372) (0.510) (0.573) (0.595) (0.346) (0.421) 
Cr*Ext 
0.405** 0.565*** 0.373* 0.770** 0.381 0.945** 0.520*** 0.663*** 
(0.175) (0.166) (0.225) (0.298) (0.240) (0.373) (0.148) (0.127) 
Conc*Cr*Ext 
 -2.056**  -2.860**  -3.672**  -2.010** 
 (1.041)  (1.350)  (1.686)  (0.852) 
Constant 
11.494*** 11.422*** 11.646*** 11.334*** 8.390*** 8.284*** 16.829*** 16.785*** 
(1.130) (1.034) (1.114) (1.049) (1.243) (1.159) (0.979) (0.980) 
Obs. 377 377 377 377 319 319 392 392 
R² 0.598 0.600 0.538 0.540 0.503 0.506 0.793 0.796 
Hansen J 0.281 0.167 0.248 0.166 0.309 0.176 0.383 0.295 
Endogeneity test 0.730 0.360 0.890 0.990 0.721 0.319 0.603 0.721 
FIRST STAGE 
Conc*Ext 
F-test 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R² 0.362 0.362 0.782 0.782 0.737 0.737 0.481 0.481 
Cr*Ext 
F-test 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R² 0.837 0.837 0.834 0.834 0.850 0.850 0.806 0.806 
Conc*Cr* 
Ext 
F-test 
 
 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
R²  0.434  0.630  0.626  0.311 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Hansen J test for over-identification restriction; p-values reported. 
Endogeneity test tests the null hypothesis that the suspected endogenous regressors can actually be 
treated as exogenous. P-values are report.  
F-test is the first stage test of excluded instruments; p-values are reported.  
First stage R² is reported. 
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Table II.7 2SLS and OLS estimation results. OLS estimation results are reported when the 
endogeneity test does not reject the null hypothesis that suspected endogenous regressors can actually 
be treated as exogenous.  The dependent variable is firm death rate in industry i, in country c. In 
columns 1-2 the sample is restricted to within the 5th and 95th percentile of the distribution of bank 
concentration. In columns 3-4 the sample is restricted to within the 5th and 95th percentile of the 
distribution of private credit. In columns 5-6 the sample is restricted to within the 5th and 95th 
percentile of the distribution of private credit and to within the 5th and 95th percentile of the 
distribution of bank concentration. In columns 7-8 the sample is restricted to within the 5th and 95th 
percentile of the distribution of firm death rate.  
Sh is the share of active firms to the total active firms in industry i, country c at the beginning of the 
period. Conc is the average during the period of an index of bank concentration (i.e. the share of the 
three largest banks on the total assets of all commercial banks) in country c. Cr is the average during 
the period of private credit to GDP in country c. Ext is an indicator of external finance dependence for 
each industry i. C and I are the country and industry dummy, respectively. The instruments for Conc, 
Cr, and Conc*Cr are: Restr measures the degree of restrictiveness on bank activities and ownership in 
country c. Own measures percentage f deposits held in privately owned banks in country c. ForComp 
is a composite measure of competition from foreign banks in country c. 
 
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Dependent Death rate 
Sh 
0.022 0.022 -0.006 -0.004 -0.012 -0.008 0.014 0.014 
(0.025) (0.024) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.022) (0.022) 
Conc*Ext 
0.800* 1.184** 0.634* 0.941** 1.170*** 1.336** 0.104 0.286 
(0.463) (0.496) (0.367) (0.460) (0.426) (0.530) (0.227) (0.335) 
Cr*Ext 
0.353*** 0.481*** 0.253* 0.460** 0.158 0.528** 0.316*** 0.355*** 
(0.130) (0.117) (0.146) (0.202) (0.143) (0.236) (0.010) (0.112) 
Conc*Cr*Ext 
 -1.644**  -1.488  -2.871**  -0.601 
 (0.820)  (1.145)  (1.415)  (0.724) 
Constant 
6.364*** 6.306*** 6.626*** 6.463*** 2.958*** 5.594*** 6.120*** 6.117*** 
(0.693) (0.648) (0.717) (0.663) (0.565) (0.770) (1.187) (1.187) 
Obs. 377 377 377 377 319 319 391 391 
R² 0.480 0.483 0.431 0.433 0.447  0.664 0.645 
Hansen J 0.130 0.598 0.357 0.695 0.326 0.591 0.520 0.634 
Endogeneity test 0.979 0.153 0.134 0.127 0.288 0.047 0.928 0.843 
FIRST STAGE 
Conc*Ext 
F-test 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R² 0.362 0.362 0.782 0.782 0.737 0.737 0.481 0.481 
Cr*Ext 
F-test 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R² 0.837 0.837 0.834 0.834 0.850 0.850 0.806 0.806 
Conc*Cr* 
Ext 
F-test 
 
  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 
R²  0.434  0.630  0.626  0.311 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Hansen J test for over-identification restriction; p-values reported. 
Endogeneity test tests the null hypothesis the suspected endogenous regressors can actually be treated 
as exogenous. P-values are report. We report OLS estimations when the test does not reject the null 
hypothesis. 
F-test is the first stage test of excluded instruments; p-values are reported. 
First stage R² is reported. 
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Table II.8 2SLS and OLS estimation results. OLS estimation results are reported when the 
endogeneity test does not reject the null hypothesis that suspected endogenous regressors can actually 
be treated as exogenous. In columns 1-4 the dependent variable is firm birth rate in industry i, in 
country c. In columns 4-8 the dependent variable is firm death rate in industry i country c. Sh is the 
share of active firms to the total active firms in industry i, country c at time t. Conc is an index of bank 
concentration (the share of the three largest banks on the total assets of all commercial banks) in 
country c. Cr is the private credit to GDO in country c. C5 is the share of the three largest banks on the 
total assets of all commercial banks in country c. HHI is the Herfindal index of bank concentration 
calculated as the sum of squared share of asset of each banks to the total assets of all commercial 
banks in country c. Ext is an indicator of external finance dependence for each industry i.  C and I are 
the country and industry dummy, respectively. The instruments for Conc, Cr, and Conc*Cr are: Restr 
is an indicator of the restrictiveness of activities of banks in country c, Own is an indicator of public 
ownership of the banks in country c, and ForComp is an indicator of pressure from foreign bank 
competition in country c, and the 5-year lagged values of Conc an Cr in country c. 
 
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Dependent Birth rate Death rate 
Sh 
-0.198*** -0.198*** -0.197*** -0.195*** 0.026 0.026 0.023 0.025 
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
C5*Ext 
-0.637 0.229   0.891* 1.667**   
(0.534) (0.739)   (0.536) (0.673)   
HHI*Ext 
  -0.247 0.187   0.372*** 0.474*** 
  (0.298) (0.398)   (0.120) (0.100) 
Cr*Ext 
0.393** 0.522*** 0.397** 0.484*** 0.384*** 0.500*** 0.550* 1.061*** 
(0.173) (0.161) (0.171) (0.164) (0.123) (0.105) (0.327) (0.362) 
C5*Cr*Ext 
 -2.897**    -2.592**   
 (1.457)    (1.149)   
HHI*Cr*Ext 
   -1.940**    -2.283*** 
   (0.906)    (0.787) 
Constant 
7.327*** 7.181*** 5.706*** 5.663*** 5.040*** 4.909*** 3.873*** 3.823*** 
(0.892) (0.808) (0.917) (0.849) (0.567) (0.500) (0.579) (0.520) 
Obs. 435 435 435 435 435 435 435 435 
R² 0.623 0.625 0.623 0.624 0.473 0.478 0.474 0.480 
Hansen J 0.282 0.200 0.296 0.176 0.254 0.735 0.304 0.854 
Engoneity test 0.940 0.831 0.889 0.952 0.910 0.996 0.936 0.909 
FIRST STAGE 
C5*Ext 
F-test 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000   
R² 0.361 0.361   0.361 0.361   
HHI*Ext 
F-test   0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 
R²   0.558 0.558   0.558 0.558 
Cr*Ext 
F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R² 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.814 
C5*Cr*Ext 
F-test  0.000    0.000   
R²  0.361    0.361   
HHI*Cr*Ext 
F-test    0.000    0.000 
R²    0.342    0.342 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Hansen J test for over-identification restriction; p-values reported. 
Endogeneity test tests the null hypothesis that Conc*Ext can actually be treated as exogenous. P-
values are report. We report OLS estimations when the test does not reject the null hypothesis. 
F-test is the first stage test of excluded instruments; p-values are reported. 
 
65 
 
ESSAY III 
ASYMMETRIC REAL EFFECTS OF BANKING MARKET 
STRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT: PRELIMINARY 
EVIDENCE FROM LOCAL LEVEL DATA 
 
 
III.1 INTRODUCTION 
Coricelli and Roland (2008), using a cross-industry panel of 115 
countries for the period 1960-2003, show that during recessions the 
banking system and overall financial development significantly 
contribute to reduce output losses; when no distinction is made 
between recession and expansion, instead, the relationship seems to be 
affected by the sample composition and estimation methodology. This 
application is closely related to their work. 
Using Italian NUTS III province-level data for banking and real sectors, 
we can exploit the large differences between Northern and Southern 
provincial economic systems to test whether the theoretical conjecture 
and empirical evidence about the asymmetric effects of financial 
development on real economy performance hold at the local level. In 
particular, we want to test the hypothesis that more developed local 
financial systems are causally associated with shallower periods of 
economic decline at the local level. 
In this paper, the terms decline and expansion refer to negative and 
positive firm net entry rates (rather than to negative and positive 
production growth rates). We define a period of decline as a period 
during which an industry (in a given province) shows a negative trend 
in terms of net entry rate, and a period of expansion as one 
characterized by an industry (in a given province) negative trend in 
terms of net entry. 
Our analysis differs from Coricelli and Roland (2008) not only because 
it tests this hypothesis at the local level, but also because it looks at the 
effect of the financial system on the real sectors business demography 
rather than on value added or production growth. This choice is in part 
imposed by data availability for value added and production (i.e. they 
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are not available at a detailed industry level for NUTS III regions). It 
allows, though, to look at the effects of finance as a barrier to entry and 
a determinant to exit during different industry trends. 
Furthermore, we also look at the effects of the banking concentration, 
testing whether a more concentrated local banking market structure is 
more effective in mitigating the industry declines and expansions in 
terms of net entry. 
The effects of the development of a local banking system on the real 
economy has been widely analyzed in the economic literature. Most of 
the empirical results confirms the cross-country findings of a causal 
and positive relationship between financial development and economic 
growth, suggesting that local financial systems positively affects real 
economy performance.57 However, to our knowledge, a possible 
asymmetric impact of local financial development in periods of decline 
and expansion in terms of net entry has not been analyzed at local level 
yet. 
This works is closely related to a strand of the literature on finance and 
growth, which focused on the relationship between the development 
and structure of banking markets and firm demography of real sectors. 
The main findings show that better financial systems are casually 
correlated with higher firm entry even at the local level. For example, 
Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia (2004), using data for Italian 
provinces, find a bell-shaped relationship between bank concentration 
and firm creation, with a range where bank market power is beneficial. 
They also find that bank concentration is more beneficial for more 
                                                          
57 Some of the studies focus on the US: see, among others, Petersen and Rajan 
(1995),  Jayaratne and Strahan (2002), Black and Strahan (2002), Clarke (2004), 
Cetorelli and Strahan (2006). However, it should be noted that studies focusing 
on the US and taking the state as territorial unity reflect something different 
than regional studies within the EU. There are studies focusing on Italian 
regions and provinces: see, among others, Lucchetti et al. (2001), Bonaccorsi di 
Patti and Dell’Ariccia (2004), Guiso et al. (2004a, 2004b), Usai and Vannini 
(2005), Vaona (2008), Benfratello et al. (2008). For studies at regional level 
focusing on other EU countries, see, for example, Valverde, Humphrey and 
Fernández (2003) and Valverde, Del Paso and  Fernández (2007) for Spain.  
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“opaque” industries, and that, the development of local credit market 
has a positive effects on entry rates. Guiso et al. (2004a), using data for 
Italian provinces, find that financial development at local level is 
causally associated with higher rates of firms creation. Cetorelli and 
Strahan (2006), using data on US local markets, find that higher degrees 
of banking competition are associated with bigger firm population and 
smaller average firm size.  
We use cross-industry data at NUTS III level for real sector firm 
demography taken from the UnionCamere-Movimprese database and  
banking sector data from Bank of Italy, for the period 1999-2005. We 
employ the Rajan and Zingales (1998) methodology to capture the 
differential effects across industries and provinces. We estimate the 
model specification using OLS and iteratively reweighted least squares 
(IRLS) to control for the influence of outliers. 
Our results show that during phases of declines those provinces that 
have a more developed banking sector experience a shallower decline 
in net entry. These results hold after also after controlling for outliers 
influence and industry and regional trends. 
When interpreting the importance of local banking development and 
competition for softening the periods of economic decline, large 
differences between local economies (both in terms of economic and 
financial development) should be kept in mind; this holds true even in 
a well and long-time integrated market as Italy. Our findings may be 
relevant for the policy debate regarding regional disparities and 
financial integration within the EU. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we 
outline our hypothesis through summary statistics and reviewing the 
findings of the real effect of local financial development. In section III.3, 
we describe our dataset. In section III.4, we discuss the estimation 
methodologies. In section III.5, we report and comment our estimation 
results. Section III.6 concludes. 
 
 
 
68 
 
III.2 HYPOTHESIS 
The financial system may affect the real economy through different 
channels during periods of decline and expansion. As Coricelli and 
Roland (2008) point out, during recessions more liquidity may be 
necessary for mitigating the loss of output, while during expansions 
banks may be crucial to provide an efficient allocation of resources. 
This means that during recessions those economies that have a more 
developed financial system would less sharp economic declines. 
Coricelli and Roland (2008) find empirical support of their hypothesis 
and develop a theoretical model arguing that financial system affects 
the real economy through different channels during periods of decline 
and expansion. During periods of sustained economic growth, 
especially in developing and emerging countries, the firms finance their 
activities with alterative sources to the banking credit (i.e. trade credit). 
However, during periods of decline, such alternative sources of finance 
may increase the risk of chain failures as firms depend on other firms-
customers performance. A better banking system may reduce the risk 
of chain effects and avoid sharp recessions. Furthermore, as shown by 
Cerra and Saxena (2008), very sharp recessions can be associated with 
lower long-run growth rates, so that they can negatively affect the 
convergence path of a economy. 
We extend the Coricelli and Roland (2008) analysis by testing whether 
these findings hold at local level as well. 
Our test has the distinguishing characteristic of looking at firm net 
entry changes, focusing on the depth of local banking market  and bank 
concentration as barriers to firm access to finance when opening a 
business and remaining open. 
During periods of decline, firms’ might hardly compete for credit since 
extra credit might be decisive to stay in or to quit the market. It seems 
plausible that during periods of declines extra credit is more likely to 
influence the choice of incumbent firms about staying in the market 
than during periods of expansion.  
At the same time, competition for credit of the incumbents may result 
in higher barrier to access to financial sources by new entrepreneurs 
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willing to enter the market. As periods of decline become longer and 
deeper, firms exit rates may increase and entry rates decrease. The 
negative net entry may thus result bigger.  
More credit availability at local level may reduce these barriers. We 
therefore test whether the depth of local credit markets are associated 
with shallower declines in net entry. 
We could also consider an alternative interpretation. During periods of 
expansion, banks can efficiently allocate the credit, which does not 
necessarily imply higher net entry rates though. This may also be 
reflected through lower rates of firm exit during the future periods of 
decline. The shallower declines experienced by industries located in 
more developed banking market may therefore be the product of both 
sufficient liquidity availability and the presence of less risky firms (i.e. 
firms that are more likely to survive even when there is a generalized 
tendency to exit in the industry). 
The analysis of the Italian banking system provides a useful insight. 
Large differences can be analyzed in terms of development of banking 
system development among the Italian provinces, while little risk of 
incurring in omitted variables since they belong to the same legal and 
regulatory framework.58 
As Figure III.1 shows, differences in terms of financial development 
still persist across provinces, with Southern provinces displaying a 
particularly low level of development. 
We start from the observation that about a third of Italian provinces 
have a GDP per capita lower than 75% of the EU (Figure III.2). This 
                                                          
58 During the period of analysis the Italian banking market was already 
liberalized, as the reforms and liberalization process culminated with the 1993 
“Testo unico in materia bancaria e creditizia”. Before reforms started in the 
1980s, the Italian banking system was still regulated by the 1936 “Legge 
bancaria”, which was adopted after the early 1930s financial crisis. This law 
imposed the creation of four categories of credit institutions, each of which had 
varying degrees of freedom to operate and open new branches in the province 
of origin. These limits were removed with the 1993 reform (see Guiso et al., 
2004a, 2004b). 
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may be associated with low rates of efficient and innovative 
entrepreneurial activity, echoing the Schumpeterian process of creative 
destruction. In this context the firm net entry may also be a good 
indicator of innovation and growth. 
We observe that the decline in net entry rates is much more 
pronounced in the South of Italy, where both the level of banking 
development and the GDP per capita are much lower than the national 
(and European) average. Descriptive statistics indicate that during the 
periods of decline there is a clear negative relationship between the 
decline in net entry and the depth of credit market (Figure III.3). The 
relationship is instead not clearly defined during expansion periods 
(Figure III.4). 
This descriptive evidence supports a more detailed analysis to 
determine whether a causal relationship exists between banking 
development and real sector performance during industries’ periods of 
decline and expansion. 
In sum, we investigate whether industry decline in terms of net entry is 
shallower in more developed local banking markets. During periods of 
decline a better developed and more competitive banking market may 
be more effective in lending liquidity and thereby supporting efficient 
firms in remaining in the market, whereas the negative trends may be 
sharper in less developed markets. On the other hand, during positive 
trend periods credit markets may not play a primary role, and a deeper 
and more competitive banking market may not necessarily be 
associated with high growth rates.  
 
III.3 DATA 
Our final dataset was created by merging three datasets:  Data on the 
stock of active firms in each industry, province and year are from 
UnionCamere-Movimprese database; data about bank branches are 
from Bank of Italy (used to compute the bank concentration indexes); 
and data on loans and deposit are also from Bank of Italy (used to 
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create proxies for the depth of local banking markets). Our final dataset 
covers 37 industries for 103 NUTS III regions from 1999 to 2005.59 
The data regarding the firm demography at industry level are 
aggregated according to the Nace 1.1 2-digit code classification. For 
comparability reasons we dropped some industries that are influenced 
by natural endowment of provinces (i.e. agriculture, fishing, mining 
and quarrying, and manufacturing of tobacco - A, B, C, and DA16 
codes); we also dropped those industries whose performance is 
influenced by public financing (re-cycling -DN37-, energy, gas, and 
water supply –E-, education –M-, health and social work –N-, other 
community, social and personal service activities -0A90-OA92-, 
activities of households –P-); finally, we dropped financial 
intermediaries industries (J) as they are part of our right-hand side 
estimated equation.60 
As we have said in Section III.1, we define the periods of expansion or 
decline as periods when the net entry is positive or negative, 
respectively. As a measure of industry expansion (or decline), we take 
the average percentage change of (the absolute value of) net entry over 
the period of expansion (or decline). Each period q ends when the sign 
of net entry changes, so that the number of years t belonging to any 
period q can vary from t0 to tn (since our dataset covers a period of 7 
                                                          
59 The database Movimprese is based on the collection of information from the 
local chambers of commerce about firm demography. It is publicly available for 
the period 1995-2007, but the time series for NUTS III GDP (used to compute 
the banking development indicator: bank loans to GDP) is available only up to 
2005; while we have data on bank loans at NUTS III level (publicly available 
from Istat and Bank of Italy, source Bank of Italy) only from 1998. The updated 
Eurostat-Regio database does not contain GDP data for the former four 
provinces of Sardinia used in this work (in 2005 Sardinia provincial territorial 
division changed from four to eight provinces), so they have been estimated on 
the basis of the provinces’ value added and regional GDP (available from 
Eusostat); we do not include the new four provinces of Sardinia.  
60 We follow Klapper et al. (2006) in excluding those industries. 
72 
 
years, the q can vary at maximum from t0 to t7).61 According to this 
definition, our dependent variable (ΔNE) for each industry showing a 
trend of n consecutive years looks as follows: 
 
ΔNEp,i,q=[(1+NEp,i,t0)... (1+NE p,i,tn)]- 1 
 
where NE is (the absolute value of) the net entry rate in a given 
industry i, province p, and period t, and it is defined as the percentage 
change of the number of firms compared to the previous year.62  
Descriptive statistics show that the distribution of the average 
percentage change of net entry (ΔNE) over the period of expansion (or 
decline) is affected by the presence of outlying values (Table III.1). In 
part, this is due to the construction of the (ΔNE) variable as the entry 
rates may result in very high (low) percentage changes, especially 
when the number of original stock is characterized by low (high) 
number of firms. Not controlling for outliers would imply to assign a 
similar to weight to a change of 200% in industries with high density of 
firms and in industries with a low density.63 However, these outliers 
                                                          
61 As part of our future research agenda, we intend to use also other definitions, 
for example, for computing the areas of firm growth and loss during the 
positive and negative trends. 
62 We have also tried to define the net entry as the number of registered firms 
minus the number of firms that exit at any time t over the number of firms 
registered in the previous year. The results are similar and are available upon 
request. However, we believe that looking at the active firms, rather than 
registered firms, would allow us to avoid to take in account those firms that are 
still registered but do not operate in the market for several reasons. In other 
words, we believe that the change of the stock of active firms better reflects the 
change in the market performance. 
63 The summary statistics (Table III.1) show the presence of extreme outliers. 
For example, the industry Nace-64 (post and telecommunication) for the 
province of Mantova shows the highest value of the average percentage change 
in net entry during the periods of expansion. Looking at the values of the stock 
of active firms in that province-industry, we can notice that it has had an very 
high growth in 7 years. However, this is due to the very low presence of firms 
73 
 
have been detected and we will conduct our estimations controlling for 
them, by either using estimation techniques robust to outliers (IRLS) or 
dropping the tails  the distributions from the estimated sample. As the 
summary statistics show these outliers are in the extreme tails of the 
distributions. 
The banking system independent variables used are the ratio of loans 
to GDP (Cr) at NUTS III which indicates the depth of local marking 
market and is here used as a proxy of local banking development. This 
measure comes from the Bank of Italy and is closely related to the 
credit to GDP ratio, which is widely used in the finance and growth 
literature as a proxy for banking development.64  
We used the raw data from the Bank of Italy regarding the number of 
banks’ branches to compute different measures of bank concentration. 
In fact, we computed C3 ratio and C5 ratio, defined as the share in  
number of bank branches of the three and five (respectively) largest 
banks to the total number of branches in the province in a given year. 
We also computed the Herfindahl index of bank concentration (HHI), 
defined as the sum of the square of each banks share of number of bank 
branches to the total number of branches in a given province and year. 
Descriptive statistics for banking system variables  (Table III. 1 and and 
Figure III.1) show that the Italian province level banking markets are 
characterized by large differences among provinces, both in terms of 
depth and market structure. The correlation matrix (Table III.3) shows  
a negative correlation between the concentration and the depth of local 
banking markets. The indicator of bank concentration are highly 
correlated between each other. 
  
III.4 METHODOLOGY AND ESTIMATED EQUATIONS 
To exploit the cross-industry structure of the dataset we apply the 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) methodology that has been widely used in 
                                                                                                                               
at the beginning of the period. The post and telecommunication industry show 
also other outliers (even if not so extremes) for some other provinces.  
64 See the World Bank Financial Structure database by Beck et al. (2000). 
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the finance and growth literature. This methodology control for fixed 
effects and reduce reverse causality and endogeneity problems. 
In their seminal work Rajan and Zingales (1998) assume that firms 
within a given industry do not differ much in terms of external finance 
dependence. The need of external finance is assumed to be mainly due 
to technological reasons, so that there is much more difference between 
industries than within them. Using firm level data Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) develop an industry-specific indicator of external finance 
dependence, which is defined as the industry-level median of the ratio 
of capital expenditures minus cash flows to capital expenditures. This 
index measures the portion of capital expenditures not financed by 
internally generated cash, so indicating the intensity of the relationship 
between the median firm in each industry and the financial markets. 
The original indicator is computed for US quoted firms since they 
assume that US financial markets are the most advanced and the firms’ 
optimal choice of external finance is based merely on technological 
reasons. Where computed for other countries, this indicator of external 
finance would reflect differences between supply and demand of 
credit. They used this indicator as measure of technological 
dependence on external finance for a sample of 42 countries, assuming 
that the value of external finance dependence for a given industry is 
likely to be the same across countries in relative terms, i.e. if compared 
to the other industries of the same country. 
Furthermore, including the indicator in a sample that excludes the US 
the indicator enters as exogenous and it may alleviates endogeneity 
problems which may affect the relationship between financial system 
and real economy performance. 
By estimating an interaction term between the financial variable of 
interest and this indicator of external finance, we estimate the 
differential effect across industries. Assuming that firms external 
finance dependence is a channel through which financial development 
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impacts firms performance, this allows to differentiate the effect across 
industries. 65 
The indicator used in this paper is at Nace 1.1 industry-level of 
aggregation and comes from Klapper et al. (2006). Precisely, it is 
calculated following Rajan and Zingales (1998) for US quoted firms 
during the 1990s. This indicator has the advantage to fit with the 
industry aggregation of our dataset.66  
Our baseline estimated model looks as follows: 
 
ΔNEp,i,q=α + γ Shp,i,t0+ β(Crp,t0* Exti)+ σp + γi + δq + εp,i,q 
 
where ΔNEp,i,q is the average percentage change of (the absolute value 
of) net entry during the decline or expansion period q, in province p 
and industry i. Shp,i,t0 is the ratio of active firms of industry i to the total 
number of active firms in province p taken at the beginning of the 
decline or expansion period; this allows to control for the relative 
importance of any industry in the whole economy and its potential 
growth and convergence. Exti is the index of external finance 
dependence, while Crp,t0 is the indicator of bank development 
expressed as the ratio of loans to GDP in each province p taken at the 
beginning of the period. σp , γi and δq are the province, industry, and 
year fixed effects, respectively. The fixed effects allow to identify an 
independent effect of banking system development on real sector 
performance, so that our results are not merely a product of structural 
                                                          
65 For the sake of comparison, Benfratello et al. (2008), studying the impact of 
banking development on firm innovation and using cross-industry for a cross-
section of Italian provinces during the 1990s, use the original indicator of 
external finance dependence for only manufacturing industry calculated for US 
firms during the 1980s. 
66 We thank Luc Laeven for sharing this indicator. 
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characteristics of the provinces and industries.67 Furthermore, calendar 
year dummies allow to control for business cycle and for the shocks 
that might occur during the period. 
When the ΔNEp,i,q refers to the periods of decline (expressed in terms of 
absolute value), a negative sign of the estimated β coefficient means 
that industries that need more external finance have shallower decline 
in net entry in provinces with a more developed banking system. For 
any given industry, the decline in net entry is shallower in those 
provinces with more developed banking markets. 
When the ΔNEp,i,q refers to the periods of expansion, a negative sign of 
β means that industries that need more external finance have lower 
growth in net entry in provinces with a more developed banking 
system. For any given industry, the net entry is less important in those 
provinces with more developed banking markets. 
One of the aims of this study is to analyze the effect of banking market 
structure as well. Therefore, we also estimated a model where we 
included an interaction term between the industry specific indicator of 
external finance dependence and an indicator of bank concentration for 
any given province and year.  
 
III.5 ESTIMATION RESULTS 
We are interested in understanding whether the depth of credit market 
has different effects on the net entry rates in periods of decline and 
expansion.  
Based on our specification the Chow test statistics in Table III.4 shows 
that there is a structural break for the periods of decline and periods of 
                                                          
67 For instance, the effect EU structural funds contributions, which are 
particularly relevant for firm demography, especially in Southern provinces, is 
capture by province dummies. We also tried to include a dummy variable for 
all the Southern regions: the estimation results are similar. Results available 
under request. In Section II.6 we discuss the estimation results for model 
specifications that includes industry and regional trends. We obtain similar 
results. 
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expansion. We then estimate the models for the sub-samples of decline 
and expansion periods. 
We estimate the model specifications using both OLS and iteratively 
reweighed least squares (IRLS) regressions, to control for possible 
outliers. As discussed in Section III.3, controlling for outliers is 
necessary since our dependent variable is expressed in terms of 
percentage changes of the stock of active firms which may result. For 
this reason, we also estimate the model specification using OLS but 
after that the sample has been restricted to within the 5th and the 95th 
percentile of the distributions of the dependent variables.  
Overall the baseline results (see Table III.4) show that higher levels of 
bank credit to GDP is causally and significantly associated with 
shallower industry decline in net entry, whereas during the periods of 
expansion the relationship is not statistically significant. 
These results confirm our hypothesis that a more developed local 
banking market helps mitigate negative trends in net entry.  
During periods of decline instead firms are more likely to need access 
to bank credit as own financial resources and trade credit may be 
scarce, especially when long and deep downturns occur. In this case, 
firms located in provinces with more developed local credit markets 
would have a relatively easier access to credit. Therefore, a higher 
number of firms would obtain liquidity that may allow them to remain 
in the market. 
During periods of expansion, the depth of credit market does not seem 
to have a significant role in increasing the firm net entry.  
A simple calculation makes it easier to interpret our results related to 
the fact that we are estimating the differential effect between industries. 
Namely, a positive coefficient of (Cr x Ext) means that a switch from 
the province at 25th percentile of the loans to GDP distribution to the 
province at the 75th percentile would have a greater impact on the 
industry that has an external finance dependence at the 75th percentile 
of the distribution of external finance dependence (70: real estate 
activities) compared to an industry at the 25th percentile of the same 
distribution (31: manufacture of electrical machinery). Given a 
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coefficient of 0.02 (Table III.4 column 3), the differential effect would be 
-0.0023 on the average percentage change in firm (absolute) net entry 
during the decline periods.68 Considering that the median value of the 
average percentage change of absolute values of net entry rates during 
the decline periods is 0.052, it means that this change would reduce the 
decline of around 4.5% respect to the median decline. 
In Table III.3 we report also the estimated coefficient of the OLS 
estimation without neglecting the tails of the dependent variables 
distributions. The estimated coefficients are bigger than in IRLS and 
OLS for the restricted sample to with 5th to 95th percentile of the 
dependent variables distributions. This bias is due to the presence of 
outlier. However, the sign and significance of the coefficient of the 
variable loans on GDP is consistent with the results of the other 
estimates for the decline periods sub-sample, while for the expansion 
periods sub-sample is not statistically significant like the other 
estimates. 
 
III.6 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
In this section we comment several checks of robustness to control for 
the stability of the baseline results. We are confident that IRLS 
estimations mitigate the influence of the outliers. However we also 
report the OLS estimations, for the restricted sample within the 5th to 
95th percentile of the dependent variables distributions. 
We estimate an augmented model including both bank loans on GDP 
and bank concentration measures (using different proxies for bank 
concentration, namely the C3 and C5 ratios, and the Herfindal index). 
The estimation results (Table III.5 columns 1-6 and Table III.6 columns 
1-6) confirm the asymmetric effects of banking market variables. In 
particular that banking credit is a relief for the real economy during 
                                                          
68 Mathematically:  x (Cr75-Cr25)*(Ext75-Ext25), where  is the estimated 
coefficient, Ext75 and Ext25 are the values of the external finance dependence 
variable at the 75th and 25th percentile of its distribution, respectively, while 
Cr75 and Cr25 are the values of the banking market development variable at 
the 75th and 25th percentile of its province-year distribution, respectively. 
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periods of decline, while higher bank concentration is detrimental. The 
latter result confirms that local banking market concentration has an 
effect on the real economy and in particular higher levels of local bank 
concentration have a negative impact on the net entry of firms as they 
are associated to deeper declines.  
To interpret the coefficients of bank concentration two facts must be 
recalled. First, Italy has a liberalized banking market; and second, if 
compared at international level it has an high level of institutional and 
regulatory environment that influences both banking sector and 
creditor protection. However, there is a degree of variation at the 
provincial level of the institutional framework especially concerning 
the legal enforcement and efficiency. In this context, we do not 
surprisingly obtain an estimate showing negative real effects of higher 
levels of local bank concentration. The negative effect of bank market 
power predicted by the conventional market theories seems here to 
prevail on the positive role of bank concentration which is instead 
predicted by the “information-based” hypothesis. 
During economic downturn higher bank concentration may result in 
more difficult access to finance for firms. For instance, during a period 
of industry decline there is smaller room for firms in the market. Firms 
competition over credit becomes much harder, and not obtaining 
liquidity may sometimes result in exit the market. If the banking 
market is concentrated firms, facing the negative trend of the industry 
and thereby demanding more liquidity, may pay higher prices than 
those available in more competitive banking markets. Still, banks with 
market power may  have preferential agreements with particular firms, 
thus, banks may decide to lend (and probably to save them from 
exiting the market).  
Higher prices and preferential agreements would both result in more 
difficult access to finance for smaller firms. Therefore, not surprisingly, 
higher bank concentration significantly contributes to the exit of a 
higher number of firms during periods of decline.  
The same arguments can be used to interpret the fact that during 
periods of expansion bank concentration does not seem to have a 
significant role on net entry. Furthermore, this result indicates that local 
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banking systems fail to finance highly innovative activities that 
represent, sometimes, the core of firm dynamism of an industry. 
To further control whether our results are driven by the presence of  
outliers, we restrict the sample to within the 5th and the 95th percentile 
of the distributions of the loans to GDP independent variable. Table 
III.5 (columns 7 and 8) and Table III.6 (columns 7 and 8) show 
estimation results that confirm the previous findings.  
Finally, we control for industry and province time trends in order to 
capture those effects that vary during the year and may influence an 
industry’s or a province’s performance. It might be the case that the 
inclusion of simple industry and province dummy variables do not 
provide fully control for other determinant of firm net entry. This tend 
to vary also during the time dimension, even if our period of analysis is 
relatively short. The inclusion of these trend dummies may be 
particularly useful to control for specific shocks to industries or 
provinces. 
We estimate three different models (Tables III.7 and III.8) to control for 
some possible combinations of interaction between province, industry 
and year dimension. However, the estimation of these models 
(especially those including province-year trends) drastically increases 
the number of dummies included and reduces the degree of freedom. 
We have therefore decided to include dummies for the higher level of 
territorial aggregation (NUTS II) so controlling for regions-time trends. 
Italy is disaggregated in 20 NUTS II regions and 103 NUTS III 
provinces. The inclusion of NUTS II dummies interacted with the 7 
year dummies thus increases degrees of freedom. It seems plausible to 
consider that provinces within the a region are affected by the same 
aggregate shocks in a given year. Also, that is likely that aggregate time 
varying omitted variables do not differ much across provinces within a 
region (Tables III.7 columns 1-2 and III.8 columns 1-2).  
Another model specification includes the industry-year dummies in 
order to control for trends and shocks in a given industry in Italy. In 
this case we control for industry specific shocks that may have occurred 
in given years (Tables III.7 columns 3-4 and III.8 columns 3-4). 
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Finally, we estimate a model which includes both regional and industry 
trends (Tables III.7 columns 5-6 and III.8 columns 5-6). 
The estimation results (Tables III.7 and III.8) confirm that the local 
credit development helps in mitigating strong decline in net entry,  
while does not spur net entry during expansion periods, even after 
controlling for several regional and industry trends. 
 
III.7 CONCLUSION 
This paper tested the hypothesis that the depth local credit market and 
bank concentration have an asymmetric effect on the performance of 
real sector during periods of decline and expansion in term of net entry. 
To our knowledge this paper is the first testing this hypothesis by using 
local data. We used data NUTS III data for Italy, which has large 
differences both in terms of local financial system development and 
real sector performance and growth. 
We find that during downturns in net entry, a more developed local 
credit markets reduce tends to smooth the trend of the real economy. 
During periods of decline, firms’ rising need of liquidity to stay in the 
market (even for more efficient firms) can be better met by more 
developed banking markets, so that the probability of their exit is 
reduced.  
Similarly to most of the previous literature our findings show that local 
finance matters and, in particular, that local differences in terms of 
depth and competition of credit market are important to mitigate real 
economy decline, even within a long-time integrated area such as Italy. 
These results support the view that within financially and economically 
integrated areas regional disparities in terms of real sector performance 
may be in part explained by differences in development and 
competition of local banking markets.  
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APPENDIX AT CHAPTER III: TABLES OF SUMMARY STATISTICS AND 
RESULTS 
Figure III.1 (Source: own elaboration on Bank of Italy and Eurostat data) 
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Figure III.4 (Source: own elaboration on  Eurostat data) 
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Figure III.1. Average percentage deviation from the mean decline in number of firms and 
provincial bank loans to GDP. 
 
 
 
Figure III.2. Average percentage deviation from the mean growth in number of firms and 
provincial bank loans to GDP. 
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Table III.1 Summary statistics. ΔNE is the average percentage change of the absolute value of the 
net entry rates during following the periods of decline or expansion in industry i and province p. We 
also report statistics for a restricted sample to within 5th and 95th percentile of the variable 
distributions.  Sh is the share of the number of firms in industry i over the total number of firms of 
province p at the beginning of the decline (or expansion) periods. Cr is the ratio between loans and 
GDP in each province p at the beginning of the decline (or expansion) periods. C3 and C5 are the 
share of number of branches of the three and five largest banks over the total number of branches of 
province p at the beginning of the decline (or expansion) periods. HHI is the Herfindal index of bank 
concentration calculated as the sum of the squared share of branches of each banks over the total 
number of branches in the province p at the beginning of the decline (or expansion) periods. 
 
 
 Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 1st perc. 5th perc. 50th perc 95th perc. 99th perc. 
ΔNE decline 0.124 0.206 0.000 3.781 0.001 0.004 0.052 0.486 1.000 
ΔNE expans. 0.301 1.231 0.000 75.000 0.001 0.005 0.094 1.000 3.375 
ΔNE decline 
5th – 95th perc. 
0.093 0.101 0.004 0.486 0.004 0.007 0.052 0.333 0.426 
ΔNE expans. 
5th – 95th perc. 
0.182 0.218 0.005 1.000 0.006 0.009 0.094 0.667 1.000 
Sh 0.024 0.046 0.000 0.355 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.115 0.239 
Cr 0.555 0.261 0.149 2.000 0.190 0.232 0.515 0.961 1.399 
C3 0.562 0.115 0.265 0.94 0.289 0.404 0.545 0.767 0.903 
C5 0.694 0.107 0.306 0.992 0.431 0.537 0.693 0.888 0.953 
HHI 0.159 0.090 0.038 0.725 0.068 0.084 0.137 0.289 0.627 
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Table III.2 Ext is the industry index of external finance for  (Klapper et al., 2006), and simple mean 
values for ΔNEd (i.e. the average percentage change of the absolute value of net entry rates during 
following the periods of decline) and ΔNEe (i.e. the average percentage change of the net entry rates 
during following periods of expansion). 
 
 
Nace 
1.1 
code 
Ext ΔNEd ΔNEe 
Nace 
1.1 
code 
Ext ΔNEd ΔNEe 
DA15 0.181 0.013 0.177 DM34 0.394 0.172 0.400 
DA16 0.262 0.116 0.112 DM35 0.124 0.129 0.349 
DB17 0.174 0.160 0.056 DN36 0.376 0.038 0.132 
DB18 0.098 0.193 0.121 F45 0.470 0.006 0.311 
DC19 0.156 0.114 0.025 G50 0.743 0.027 0.023 
DD20 0.123 0.137 0.164 G51 0.598 0.016 0.072 
DE21 0.096 0.041 0.100 G52 0.304 0.018 0.048 
DE22 -0.044 0.491 0.575 H55 0.425 0.013 0.123 
DF23 0.791 0.153 0.095 I60 0.233 0.045 0.024 
DG24 0.300 0.083 0.119 I61 -0.053 0.318 0.466 
DH25 -0.121 0.040 0.062 I62 0.100 0.604 0.630 
DI26 0.147 0.234 0.166 I63 0.241 0.040 0.415 
DJ27 0.166 0.021 0.089 I64 0.856 0.179 2.664 
DJ28 0.077 0.037 0.086 K70 0.489 0.032 0.867 
DK29 0.502 0.156 0.873 K71 0.466 0.051 0.330 
DL30 0.137 0.105 0.105 K72 1.239 0.015 0.383 
DL31 0.328 0.344 0.106 K73 2.859 0.243 0.463 
DL32 0.643 0.035 0.074 K74 0.501 0.023 0.240 
DL33 0.181 0.013 0.177  0.259 0.015 0.031 
 
 
 
Table III.3 Correlation matrix. Cr is the ratio between loans and GDP in each province p at the 
beginning of the decline (or expansion) periods. C3 and C5 are the share of number of branches of the 
three and five largest banks over the total number of branches of province p at the beginning of the 
decline (or expansion) periods. HHI is the Herfindal index of bank concentration calculated as the 
sum of the squared share of branches of each banks over the total number of branches in the province 
p at the beginning of the decline (or expansion) periods. 
 
 
 Cr C3 C5 HHI 
Cr 1    
C3 -0.225 1   
C5 -0.299 0.891 1  
HHI -0.225 0.831 0.741 1 
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Table III.4 Baseline estimation results. OLS estimation for the whole distributions of the 
dependent variables (columns 1 and 4),  OLS estimation for restricted samples to within the 5th and 
95th percentiles (columns 2 and 5) of the dependent variables, and IRLS estimation for the whole 
sample of the dependent variable (columns 3 and 6). 
In columns 1-3 the dependent variable ΔNE is the average percentage change of the absolute value of 
net entry rates during following the periods of decline in industry i and province p.  In columns 4-6 
the depended variable ΔNE is the average percentage change of the net entry rates during following 
periods of expansion in industry i and province p. Sh is the share of the number of firms in industry i 
over the total number of firms of province p at the beginning of the decline (or expansion) periods. Cr 
is the ratio between loans and GDP in each province p at the beginning of the decline (or expansion) 
period. Ext is an indicator of external finance dependence for each industry i, defined following Rajan-
Zingales (1998). P, I, and Y are province, industry, and year dummies, respectively. 
 
 
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent ΔNE during decline periods ΔNE during expansion periods 
Estimation OLS 
OLS 
5th-95th 
IRLS OLS 
OLS 
5th-95th 
IRLS 
Sh 
0.038 0.063 -0.077 -0.300 0.139 0.039 
(0.086) (0.094) (0.050) (0.263) (0.149) (0.085) 
Cr*Ext 
-0.043** -0.018* -0.020*** 0.161 -0.001 -0.002 
(0.021) (0.011) (0.006) (0.098) (0.023) (0.008) 
Constant 
-0.029 0.030 -0.000 0.534*** 0.343*** 0.272*** 
(0.029) (0.021) (0.021) (0.120) (0.052) (0.020) 
P Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
I Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Y Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 4894 4404 4894 5568 5018 5568 
R-squared 0.386 0.413 0.703 0.177 0.442 0.901 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Note:  
Chow test for a structural break of the model after OLS (full distribution) estimation: F(149, 
10168)=15.39*** 
Chow test for a structural break of the model after OLS (for restricted sample within 5th-95th 
distributions of dependent variable in both sub-samples) estimation: F(149, 9128)=23.80*** 
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Table III.5 Robustness checks during periods of decline estimation results after controlling for 
bank concentration and banking credit outliers.  OLS estimation for restricted samples to within the 5th 
and 95th percentiles (columns 1, 3, 5, and 7) of the dependent variables, and IRLS estimation for the 
whole sample of the dependent variable (columns 2, 4, 6, and 8) during the periods of decline. 
In columns 7 and 8 we estimate the model for a restricted samples to within the 5th and 95th of the 
loans on GDP independent variable (Cr). The dependent variable ΔNE is the average percentage 
change of the absolute value of net entry rates during following the periods of decline in industry i 
and province p.  Sh is the share of the number of firms in industry i over the total number of firms of 
province p at the beginning of the decline periods. Cr is the ratio between loans and GDP in each 
province p at the beginning of the decline periods. Ext is an indicator of external finance dependence 
for each industry i, defined following Rajan-Zingales (1998). C3 and C5 are the share of number of 
branches of the three and five largest banks over the total number of branches of province p at the 
beginning of the decline periods. HHI is the Herfindal index of bank concentration calculated as the 
sum of squared share of branches of each banks over the total number of branches in the province p at 
the beginning of the decline periods. P, I, and Y are province, industry, and year dummies, 
respectively. 
 
 
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Dependent ΔNE during decline periods 
Model I II III IV 
Estimation 
OLS 
5th-95th 
IRLS 
OLS 
5th-95th 
IRLS 
OLS 
5th-95th 
IRLS 
OLS 
5th-95th 
IRLS 
Sh 
0.066 -0.076 0.065 -0.076 0.066 -0.075 0.089 -0.092 
(0.094) (0.050) (0.094) (0.050) (0.094) (0.050) (0.109) (0.057) 
Cr*Ext 
-0.014 -0.019*** -0.013 -0.019*** -0.012 -0.018*** -0.035* -0.019** 
(0.011) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.019) (0.009) 
C3*Ext 
0.066*** 0.033**       
(0.025) (0.014)       
C5*Ext 
  0.056* 0.009     
  (0.030) (0.016)     
HHI*Ext 
    0.118*** 0.079***   
    (0.039) (0.020)   
Constant 
-0.002 0.092*** -0.003 0.123*** 0.020 -0.005 -0.007 0.012 
(0.029) (0.027) (0.030) (0.036) (0.021) (0.021) (0.037) (0.034) 
P Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
I Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Y Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 4404 4894 4404 4894 4404 4894 3830 4258 
R-squared 0.414 0.704 0.413 0.704 0.414 0.704 0.413 0.749 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table III.6 Robustness checks during periods of expansion estimation results after controlling for 
bank concentration and banking credit outliers.  OLS estimation for restricted samples to within the 5th 
and 95th percentiles (columns 1, 3, 5, and 7) of the dependent variables, and IRLS estimation for the 
whole sample of the dependent variable (columns 2, 4, 6, and 8) during the periods of expansion. 
In columns 7 and 8 we estimate the model for a restricted samples to within the 5th and 95th of the 
loans on GDP independent variable (Cr). The dependent variable ΔNE is the average percentage 
change of the net entry rates during following the periods of expansion in industry i and province p.  
Sh is the share of the number of firms in industry i over the total number of firms of province p at the 
beginning of the expansion periods. Cr is the ratio between loans and GDP in each province p at the 
beginning of the expansion periods. Ext is an indicator of external finance dependence for each 
industry i, defined following Rajan-Zingales (1998). C3 and C5 are the share of number of branches of 
the three and five largest banks over the total number of branches of province p at the beginning of 
the expansion periods. HHI is the Herfindal index of bank concentration calculated as the sum of 
squared share of branches of each banks over the total number of branches in the province p at the 
beginning of the expansion periods. P, I, and Y are province, industry, and year dummies, 
respectively. 
 
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Dependent ΔNE during expansion periods 
Model I II III IV 
Estimation 
OLS 
5th-95th 
IRLS 
OLS 
5th-95th 
IRLS 
OLS 
5th-95th 
IRLS 
OLS 
5th-95th 
IRLS 
Sh 
0.139 0.038 0.139 0.036 0.141 0.039 0.054 0.031 
(0.149) (0.086) (0.149) (0.085) (0.149) (0.085) (0.164) (0.098) 
Cr*Ext 
-0.000 -0.005 -0.007 -0.009 0.007 -0.004 0.002 0.014 
(0.023) (0.008) (0.024) (0.008) (0.023) (0.008) (0.040) (0.014) 
C3*Ext 
0.004 -0.031       
(0.066) (0.020)       
C5*Ext 
  -0.055 -0.072***     
  (0.072) (0.021)     
HHI*Ext 
    0.114 -0.028   
    (0.089) (0.026)   
Constant 
0.361*** 0.239*** 0.360*** 0.338*** 0.278*** 0.273*** 0.716*** 0.304*** 
(0.048) (0.040) (0.048) (0.050) (0.069) (0.020) (0.080) (0.035) 
P Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
I Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Y Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 5018 5568 5018 5568 5018 5568 4240 4705 
R-squared 0.442 0.901 0.442 0.901 0.442 0.901 0.442 0.907 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table III.7 Robustness checks during periods of decline estimation results for models including 
time trends.  OLS estimation for restricted samples to within the 5th and 95th percentiles (columns 1, 3, 
and 5) of the dependent variables, and IRLS estimation for the whole sample of the dependent 
variable (columns 2, 4, and 6) during the periods of decline. 
The dependent variable ΔNE is the average percentage change of the absolute value of net entry rates 
during following the periods of decline in industry i and province p.  Sh is the share of the number of 
firms in industry i over the total number of firms of province p at the beginning of the decline periods. 
Cr is the ratio between loans and GDP in each province p at the beginning of the decline periods. Ext 
is an indicator of external finance dependence for each industry i, defined following Rajan-Zingales 
(1998). R, P, I, and Y are region, province, industry, and year dummies, respectively. 
 
 
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent ΔNE during decline periods 
Model I II III 
Estimation 
OLS 
5th-95th 
IRLS 
OLS 
5th-95th 
IRLS 
OLS 
5th-95th 
IRLS 
Sh 
0.078 -0.045 0.015 -0.098** 0.032 -0.078 
(0.094) (0.050) -0.093 (0.049) (0.092) (0.049) 
Cr*Ext 
-0.030*** -0.028*** -0.012 -0.017*** -0.024** -0.025*** 
(0.010) (0.006) -0.012 (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) 
Constant 
-0.012 -0.001 0.033 0.011 -0.009 0.001 
(0.025) (0.029) -0.032 (0.047) (0.040) (0.051) 
P No No Yes Yes No No 
R*Y Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
I Yes Yes No No No No 
I*Y No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 4404 4894 4404 4894 4404 4894 
R-squared 0.405 0.705 0.467 0.818 0.460 0.826 
Robust standard errors in parentheses      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table III.8 Robustness checks during periods of expansion estimation results for models including 
time trends.  OLS estimation for restricted samples to within the 5th and 95th percentiles (columns 1, 3, 
and 5) of the dependent variables, and IRLS estimation for the whole sample of the dependent 
variable (columns 2, 4, and 6) during the periods of expansion. 
The dependent variable ΔNE is the average percentage change of net entry rates during following the 
periods of expansion in industry i and province p.  Sh is the share of the number of firms in industry i 
over the total number of firms of province p at the beginning of the expansion periods. Cr is the ratio 
between loans and GDP in each province p at the beginning of the expansion periods. Ext is an 
indicator of external finance dependence for each industry i, defined following Rajan-Zingales (1998). 
R, P, I, and Y are region, province, industry, and year dummies, respectively. 
 
 
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent ΔNE during expansion periods 
Model I II III 
Estimation 
OLS 
5th-95th 
IRLS 
OLS 
5th-95th 
IRLS 
OLS 
5th-95th 
IRLS 
Sh 
0.141 0.057 0.042 0.045 0.048 0.057 
(0.151) (0.086) (0.144) -0.079 (0.144) (0.081) 
Cr*Ext 
-0.021 -0.020*** -0.005 -0.018** -0.026 -0.029*** 
(0.151) (0.086) (0.144) (0.079) (0.144) (0.081) 
Constant 
0.395*** 0.316*** 0.048 0.559*** -0.081 -0.325*** 
(0.02) (0.007) (0.025) (0.007) (0.022) (0.007) 
P No No Yes Yes No No 
R*Y Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
I Yes Yes No No No No 
I*Y No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 5018 5568 5018 5568 5018 5568 
R-squared 0.450 0.905 0.491 0.958 0.501 0.958 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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